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ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been a rise in the frequency and severity of natural disasters.
The economic costs associated with these extreme events exceeded $110 billion in the year 2012
alone. While the causes for these events are many and the subject of current controversy there is
little doubt that man’s role in rapid urbanization is amplifying the impacts of such occurrences
and adds a layer of complexity to efforts aimed at mitigation. While there are systems in place
there is a need for a national overhaul of the methods currently active for the mitigation and
protection of vulnerable critical infrastructure and the communities devastated by natural
disasters.

This thesis presents a framework and research approach to provide a means to

reducing physical and economic damages associated with natural disasters. A case study is
presented illustrating the devastation that would be caused by 100, 500 and 1000-year flood
events in the Hamilton County, TN area. It was found that the damages resulting from each
storm would cause federal declarations of disaster. Mitigation, recovery and resilience efforts
are discussed in the aftermath.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
Infrastructure systems play a vital role in a nation’s economic well being and national
security posture. These systems are elaborate and dynamic in nature and the importance of each
system is emphasized by the need to sustain continuity in services. While in service a certain
level of performance is expected by the user in order to maintain a standard of quality, reliability,
and comfort.

The level of service is constantly challenged by the aging process, limited

resources and disasters. The concept of infrastructure resilience has been used to determine how
to combat the impact of these challenges. By incorporating mathematical concepts such as
reliability, risk and recursion, and the business model of change management this work sets out
to establish a comprehensive framework on how to improve resilience of critical infrastructure
systems and increase public understanding of the importance of awareness of infrastructure to
public safety and socioeconomic welfare.

1.2 Research Objectives
Experts within the public and private sector have begun to pay more attention to the
growing need to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.

September 11, 2001 was an

awakening in terms of noticing a need to protect national safety and security. Many citizens
were faced with the realization that they may have to live without one of the basic necessities
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that we all have come to depend on.

The Department of Homeland Security has since

established such policies that have made an effort to organize various organizations with the
intent to secure our country’s most valuable assets. With this background the objectives of this
research are to:
1. Establish a decision support framework by incorporating principles from other areas of
interest to tie together all areas of critical infrastructure and emergency management in
relation to natural disasters.
2. Use the said framework with a case study to test its validity.

1.3 Research Approach
Quantitative and qualitative research approaches work well when the subject matter is
clearly defined and a simple decisive conclusion is necessary to answer a question. However, in
the case of developing a framework from various sources using one method over the other tends
to limit how the information will be interpreted. Qualitative approaches tend to be broad and
focus on the stages of developing research plans where quantitative analysis occurs in the
process of conducting research. The approach used in this thesis will be pragmatic so that it
transcends the distinction between knowledge that is context and knowledge-based that is
universal. This method will allow the use of both quantitative and qualitative concepts and
techniques depending on what is necessary to the subject matter. The pragmatic research process
model used will have six steps: (1) determination of the question, (2) data collection, (3) data
analysis, (4) data interpretation, (5) legitimize or data validation and (6) conclusions.

2

1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis documents the process summarized above. The thesis is organized as follows:

•

Chapter 1 is the introduction to the thesis detailing problem statement, research
objectives, research approach and thesis outline.

•

Chapter 2 is the literature review covering topics such as the definition of critical
infrastructure, the interdependencies of infrastructure, the current policies protecting
infrastructure, the importance of infrastructure and decision support systems.

•

Chapter 3 details the risks associated with natural disasters impacts to infrastructure
resilience and the physical, social and economic damages related to natural disasters.

•

Chapter 4 features the framework for the critical infrastructure protection plan as well as
an overview of the program used for analysis HAZUS-MH (Hazards United States –
Multi Hazard)

•

Chapter 5 discusses the framework plan in detail as well as mitigation strategies to
combat the effects of natural disasters.

•

Chapter 6 describes urban flooding, climate change and their ever-growing impacts on
the world. Fault tree analysis is introduced and utilized as a means of determining the
root issue of urban flooding.

•

Chapter 7 outlines the economic impacts related to a flood event.

•

Chapter 8 is an overview of the case study performed for this thesis. It gives a detailed
description of all analysis as well as the results of the study.

•

Chapter 9 discusses the findings of the analysis.

•

Chapter 10 is the conclusion and recommendations for future study.
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•

Appendix A gives a step by step tutorial related to an evacuation method described in
Chapter 5
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Critical Infrastructure Definition
Infrastructure refers to systems that physically tie together metropolitan areas,
communities, and neighborhoods, and facilitate the growth of local, regional, and national
economies. These interdependent systems work together to provide the essential services of a
modern society. Over the years infrastructure has evolved in both the public’s view and how the
government addresses it. Many years ago infrastructure was defined primarily in debates about
the adequacy of the nation’s public works, which were viewed as deteriorating, obsolete, and of
insufficient capacity. The growing threat of international terrorism in the 1990’s renewed federal
interest in infrastructure issues. Unlike the previous period, which was focused on infrastructure
adequacy, federal agencies in the 1990’s were increasingly concerned about infrastructure
protection.

This concern led, in turn, policy makers to reconsider the definition of

“infrastructure” in a security context. The word critical refers to infrastructure that provides an
essential support for economic and social well-being, for public safety and for the functioning of
key government responsibilities. Thus critical infrastructure refers to systems which, if disabled
or destroyed, would result in catastrophic and far-reaching damage.

Formally, “critical

infrastructure” are those assets the loss of which would result in great harm to the nation’s
security, economy, health and safety, and morale. They include assets necessary to generate and
distribute such basic goods and services such as electricity, drinking water, telecommunications,
5

banking and finance, etc. These systems are built to provide services to several generations for
several decades. They have become so integrated into modern life that they are taken for
granted. Today, in U.S. businesses and industries, it is expected and relied on that the required
infrastructure is available to transport raw materials, to manufacture products, to deliver food and
durable goods to markets and ports, and to enable the sharing of ideas and the conduct of
transactions electronically. By 2030, an additional 60 million Americans and unknown number
of businesses will have similar demands and expectations for the services provided by these
systems.

2.2 Interdependency of infrastructure
Our nation’s social and economic welfare is dependent upon the interdependencies of our
critical infrastructure system. These systems cover a large number of sectors including the
natural gas system, electric power grid, public water services and transportation networks. In
order to enhance critical infrastructure protection plans, it is imperative to understand how they
connect and interact. Each of these systems are complex individually but understanding their
interaction is crucial especially if any of these systems are under duress. For example, after
Hurricane Katrina, the supply of crude oil and refined petroleum products was interrupted
because of loss of electric power at the pumping stations for three major transmission pipelines:
the Colonial, Plantation and Capline pipelines. [1] Because of the loss of power, about 1.4
million barrels of crude oil were lost per day and due to interruption, those pipelines were not
restored to full capacity for another 17 days after the hurricane made landfall. This is an
example of how the failure to understand the dynamics of these relationships especially in
chaotic environments can lead to misuse of resources, personnel, limited supplies and relief
6

efforts. Interdependency is a bidirectional relationship where the state of one system is directly
influenced by the state of the other. For example, system i is dependent upon the performance of
system j to execute its function and vice versa as illustrated in Figure 1.. These complex
relationships are characterized by multiple connections among infrastructures, feedback and
feed-forward paths, and intricate branching topologies [2].

System i

System j

Example of Interconnected, Dependent System
Figure 1 - Ex

Interdependencies between infrastructure systems are categorized by type according to
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly [2] as:
•

Physical – two infrastructures are physically dependent if the state of each is dependent
on the material output(s) of the other.

•

Cyber – an infrastructure has a cyber-interdependency if its state depends on information
transmitted through the information infrastruc
infrastructure.

•

Geographic – infrastructures are geographically interdependent if a local environmental
event can create state changes in all of them.

•

Logical – two infrastructures are logically interdependent if the state of each depends on
the state of the other vvia
ia a mechanism that is not a physical, cyber or geographic
connection.
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Categorizing and understanding how infrastructure is connected is essential to providing
a means to protecting it. Advancements in technology have increased the interconnectedness of
each system. Understanding the relationships will help us move forward in the preservation and
protection of these critical systems.

2.3 Current Recovery Policies for Critical Infrastructure
In order to improve resilience of critical infrastructure against future disasters, it is
important to understand existing policies and seek breaches in the current procedures. According
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) there is certain protocol to be followed
before, during and after an event has taken place [3]. FEMA’s multi-hazard mitigation planning
is to identify policies and actions that can be implemented over the long term to reduce risk and
future losses. According to FEMA, the planning process is just as important as the plan itself
because it provides a framework for risk-based decision plan making to reduce damages to lives,
property, and the economy from future disasters [4]. Mitigation is defined as the act of lessoning
the force of something unpleasant and in the context of infrastructure, it is the effort to reduce
loss of life and property by decreasing the impact of disasters. The National Disaster Recovery
Framework provides recovery support functions that are led by coordinating agencies at the
national level whose expertise are relevant to the functional area of assistance [5]. When disaster
strikes, these organizations are expected to help local communities recover.
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 has laid out a document titled the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in accordance with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) [6]. This plan is structured to create partnerships between Sector Coordinating
Councils (SCC) from the private sector and Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) from the
8

public sector with the goal of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) and
ensuring resiliency. These affiliations form a structure through which representative groups
from all levels of government and the private sector can work together or share different
approaches to CIKR protection. The concept of the NIPP provides a basic risk management
framework that includes the following steps:
•

Set Goals & Objectives: Define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, or
performance targets that collectively constitute an effective risk management posture [7]

•

Identify assets, systems, and networks: Develop an inventory of the assets, systems, and
networks, including those located outside the United States, that make up the Nation’s
CIKR or contribute to the critical functionality therein, and collect information pertinent
to risk management that takes into account the fundamental characteristics of each sector
[7]

•

Assess Risks: Evaluate the risk, taking into consideration the potential direct and indirect
consequences of a terrorist attack or other hazards (including, as capabilities mature,
seasonal changes in the consequences and dependencies and interdependencies associated
with each identified asset, system, or network), known vulnerabilities to various potential
attack methods or other significant hazards, and general or specific threat information [7]

•

Prioritize: Aggregate and compare risk assessment results to: develop an appropriate
view of asset, system, and/or network risks and associated mission continuity, where
applicable; establish priorities based on risk; and determine protection, resilience, or
business continuity initiatives that provide the greatest return on investment for the
mitigation of risk [7]

•

Implement protective programs and resiliency strategies: Select appropriate actions or
programs to reduce or manage the risk identified; identify and provide the resources
needed to address priorities [7]

•

Measure effectiveness: Use metrics and other evaluation procedures at the appropriate
national, State, local, regional, and sector levels to measure progress and assess the
effectiveness of the CIKR protection programs [7]
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This framework is on a continuous loop that allows the Federal Government and its’ partners
through this program to advance the progression over time in order to improve the protection of
CIKR.

2.4 Why Is Infrastructure Important
Infrastructure has an immediate impact on our personal and economic health and the
current infrastructure crisis is having a direct effect on our future prosperity. For many years the
infrastructure of this nation has been deteriorating and the impacts are often overlooked because
they cannot be readily defined or quantified.

The importance of infrastructure is directly

proportional to the service that it provides and each component has an immediate effect on the
quality of life in its servicing community. If the population of a community grows and there is
no improvement made to infrastructure the effects will be evident. Leisure and personal time
lost due to traffic congestion, water quality issues arising from inadequate treatment facilities,
and accidents and fatalities due to weakened bridges are all problems to be anticipated unless
more consideration is given to infrastructure systems. Every day we face deficient systems that
can no longer afford to be ignored for the safety and security of our families and loved ones.

2.5 Decision Support Systems
Infrastructure projects are complex in nature. There are several different variables at any
given point during the decision making process. Human judgment can differ when working with
a group of people based on various approaches to the same problem.

If catastrophic

circumstances are added into the equation the complexities of the decision making process only
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get more convoluted. Because of this, Decision Support Systems (DSS) are integrated to help
the decision making process. The objective of the decision support system is to reduce the
vulnerability of places and infrastructure systems through the use of mitigation strategies that
increase system resilience and resistance to the stresses imposed by disasters [8]. A decision
support system is a computer application that gathers and presents data from a wide variety of
sources and presents such information with the purpose of making decisions easier.

For

example, the program used in this thesis simulates flood events and compiles data associated
with damages. This aids decision makers in determining future mitigation plans. A successful
DSS compiles raw data, personal knowledge and relevant documents into a system to organize
information and solve problems. It is important to note that DSS do not make decisions. It is
merely a tool to present information efficiently to help in the decision making process. There are
typically four different components or subsystems that form a DSS. They are categorized by the
following: data management subsystem, model management subsystem, knowledge management
subsystem, and user interface subsystem.

2.5.1 Data Management Subsystem
The foundation to any DSS is the data. The data management subsystem executes the
task of accumulating and retaining the information that the client wants the DSS to use. Quality
data are useful, legitimate and dependable. The data stored are relevant to the topic for which
the DSS has been devised. The information that is used in data management component comes
from one of the following sources: external information, personal information and organizational
information. This component of the system should allow the user to be aware of the data
available throughout the system and let them know how to gain access to it.
11

2.5.2 Model Management Subsystem
The model management subsystem is a mirror of the data management system. This
system stores the models for the entire DSS. It allows the users to create models easily and
quickly and to manipulate such models to perform experiments and sensitivity “what if” analysis.
This system uses multiple models to support problem solving and accrues, retrieves, and
manages a wide variety of models in a logical manner. It transforms the data from the data
management subsystem into useful information to aid in the decision making process.

2.5.3 Knowledge Management Subsystem
Once the data had been acquired and the model interface has been created, the knowledge
management subsystem can be utilized. This subsystem provides the proficiency in solving
unstructured and semi-structured problems. Unstructured problems occur when the decision
making process is not straightforward and the use of unstructured, unorthodox procedures are
necessary to make a decision. These problems involve such subjects as economic, human issues
and technical problems that are multifaceted in nature. A semi-structured problem occurs when
there is data and structured evidence to support decision making available but there is still a need
for human judgment. The knowledge management subsystem clarifies what models to use, how
to use them, and how to interpret the results. It consists of rules that can bind a possible result
and methods for evaluating them. This leads to intelligent DSS.

2.5.4 User Interface Subsystem
The final and most important component in the DSS interface is the user subsystem. This
component allows the user to input data into the database and the model which then presents said
12

data in a variety of formats and output devices. If a DSS has a poorly made user interface, no
matter how sophisticated it may be, it will not be properly utilized. The output data on a
properly made user interface subsystem will provide graphics, plots and other media that will aid
in the decision making process.
Understanding the relationships between infrastructure systems and their interactions
during disaster events is essential to help minimize the damage sustained in their aftermath.
There are committees formed at a national level that discuss and plan future policy regarding
how to deal with these issues. However, there is a need for formation of state and local
commissions to deal with these problems because they are reliant on the conditions of each area.
Risk management is a process employed by persons in charge of decision making. The next
chapter discusses risk in terms of natural disasters and how to improve resiliency of
infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK
3.1 Risk Management
Risk carries several different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In
terms of assessing risk it is defined as the probability of an accident occurring times the expected
loss in case of the accident. Risk management identifies, assesses, and prioritizes risks and
organizes economical applications of the available resources in order to monitor, minimize and
control the impacts of unfortunate events. The first step in risk management is to assess the risk.
Risk assessment is the qualitative or quantitative application used to determine the level of risk
associated with a specific hazard.

This process defines the probability and severity of an

undesirable event that may possibly result from a hazard. As the assessment is conducted it is
essential to look for vulnerabilities that would make an asset more susceptible to damage from a
hazard. Qualitative risk assessment does not try to assign concrete mathematical values to assets.
It focuses on relative values from things such as surveys, questionnaires and workshops and has
a faster turnover rate than quantitative approaches because it does not rely on data. Data
collection and analysis is a process that requires time and effort that a person or business or
agency may not have. Qualitative approaches aid in saving both and because of this they provide
faster results.

Quantitative analysis is used when a numeric value is necessary to assess a

specific risk. Each component in a system is assigned a value and a cost benefit analysis is
performed. Quantitative does not necessarily mean accurate as it is difficult to exactly assign
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numbers to intangible items affected in a disaster such as the social impacts affecting a
community in the aftermath.
After the risk has been properly assessed the next step in risk management is risk
analysis. Risk analysis involves identifying the most probable threat and analyzing the related
vulnerability to the threat.

Although the exact nature of potential disasters is difficult to

determine, it is still beneficial to examine possible scenarios in order to evaluate potential
damage. The first step is to identify possible risks. These risks can come from a number of
sources. In terms of infrastructure damage the probable risks associated can occur naturally from
weather and disasters or structurally from impacts or deterioration. Once the risk has been
identified, the next step is to estimate the risk. An accepted way of estimating risk is to
determine the probability of an event occurring and multiply that value with the associated cost if
that event occurs. This is one of the most important steps; that is why it’s imperative for one to
take their time during this step. If at all possible, past information and historical data can be used
to help make an accurate hypothesis. Once risks have been estimated mitigation strategies are
put forth to prevent future hazards. Risk mitigation or treatment is the process of selecting and
executing procedures to modify risk. This step includes identifying options for mitigation,
developing action plans, approving said plans and implementation of treatment. Identification of
treatment options vary with the nature of risk associated. Decision makers have to take into
account stakeholder interest and the end users. Development of treatment plans are crucial in
order to illustrate how the selected plan will be implemented.

These plans must be

comprehensive and provide all the necessary information about resource requirements,
performance measures, roles and responsibilities of decision makers, proposed actions and
priorities.

A good plan will allow immediate action with minimal project control in crisis
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situations. Once these plans have been developed approval is necessary for the implementation.
Since factors may change during the development of plans it is necessary to have constant
communication from all levels of its development. Execution of risk management plans should
be carried out in such a way that it is embedded into an organization’s process so that it becomes
effective and efficient. The risk analysis process is a vital phase of business recovery planning.
Infrastructure management is related to business recovery planning because one of the
paramount procedures related to both is the need to anticipate and reduce the effects of potential
risks. In unforeseen circumstances there is a need for continuity of services. The probability of a
disaster occurring is extremely uncertain. Infrastructure and business management have different
processes within their lifecycles but risk management is always included. Development of
comprehensive risk and recovery plans that address all critical operations and functions is
imperative in times of disaster.
Risk impacts associated with natural disasters are usually classified under three
categories; economic, social and environmental impacts. Many of the values related to these
impacts are not quantifiable therefore they are identified by monetary and non-monetary terms.
Table 1 illustrates the quantifiable impacts of disasters.
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Table 1 Summary of Quantifiable Disaster Impacts
Monetary

Non-Monetary

Social
Household

Economic
Private Sector
Household

Public Sector
Education
Health
Water & Sewage
Electricity
Transport
Emergency
Spending
Economic Sector
Agriculture
Industry
Commerce
Services
Environmental

House damaged
or destroyed

Assets destroyed
or damaged:
buildings,
bridges,
machinery, etc.

Assets destroyed
or damaged:
crops,
machinery, etc.

Number of
Casualties
Number of
Injured
Number affected

Increase of
diseases
Stress Symptom

Loss of natural
habitats

Effects on
biodiversity

Loss of wages,
reduced
purchasing
power
Loss of
infrastructure
services

Losses due to
reduced
production

Social impacts are those that affect individuals directly as a result of a disaster. This can
encompass loss of life, injuries sustained, illnesses incurred or loss of personal items with
sentimental value. Indirect social costs can include disruption to living environments in the
event of an evacuation, mental anxiety and stress. Economic losses from disasters have
increased because exposure to people and assets has increased over time. The losses associated
with this sector are grouped into three categories; direct, indirect and secondary losses. Direct
losses are immediate damages as a result of an event. Indirect losses are a consequence of the
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physical destruction caused. Secondary losses involves estimating the aggregate impacts on the
economic variables like gross domestic product (GDP), consumption and inflation due to the
effects of disasters, as well as, due to the reallocation of government resources to relief and
reconstruction efforts [9]. Finally environmental impacts are those that effect biodiversity,
nature and other systems that cannot be quantified tangibly, but are important to the environment
and surrounding community.
3.2 Resiliency
The services provided by critical infrastructure are crucial for safety, security, and
incident management and for the continuity of government operations before, during and after an
event followed by a quick recovery to normal system operations or a reduced probability of
system failure, and reduced time to system restoration. For these reasons it is imperative for
infrastructure systems to be resilient. Resiliency can be defined in a number of ways depending
on the context of the issue. In terms of infrastructure management resiliency is the ability of a
system to withstand shock and return to form after something devastating has occurred.
Resilience can be illustrated in a number of ways including the following:
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Figure 2 - Infrastructure System under Normal Operations [10]

Figure 2 shows a system operating under normal conditions.

This could be an

interrelated system of infrastructure such as an electric power grid, public water system, and an
interstate highway system. The performance can be measured in a number of ways. For
example, the level of service of the interstate or the public water system meets all demands for
water consumption. For illustrative purposes the performance of the system in Figure 2 is
measured in dimensionless units over some dimensionless time period. In this case, this system
performs at a constant 100 units over the entire time under normal operating conditions.
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Figure 3 - Infrastructure System under Disruption of Service [11]

Figure 3 depicts the performance of a system that has reduced over time due to a
disruption. The event occurs when time = 2 which leads to a performance drop. At time = 4
recovery efforts begin and stop the decline in performance. Performance is brought back to
normal operations at time = 7 but the lighter portion of the graph represents lost operations
during the time of the event. Reduction of the total loss of performance increases resilience.
Policymakers consider what is most important during decision making for critical infrastructure
resilience. If it is monetary losses during disruption of service, measuring the total amount of
lost revenue will be critical in determining allocation of resources. When critical infrastructure
systems are robust and resilient, as opposed to deteriorating, it can mitigate the effects of a
disaster by limiting deaths and injuries, property losses, impacts on ecosystems and the time it
takes for a community to recover [12].
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The illustrations above show how important creating a resilient infrastructure system is to
their performance during and after a natural disaster. It also shows that resilience is a function of
time and preparedness.

Infrastructure systems that have been updated to withstand certain

hazards beforehand sustain a desired level of service during and after a disaster situation and
reduce the damage and disruption of service. A framework for critical infrastructure protection
must be created to support decision making. The following chapter discusses a framework on
how to approach infrastructure protection and emergency planning.
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CHAPTER 4
FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DECISION SUPPORT
SYSTEM

Any successful system needs a framework to refer back to from time to time in order to
support decisions being made.

A critical infrastructure protection decision support system

(CIPDSS) provides information for the protection of critical infrastructure based on an
assessment of risks, the likelihood of those risks occurring and the associated consequences. As
previously stated decision support systems do not make the decision, they rather support the
decision making process.

Due to the interdependences and complicated nature of critical

infrastructure systems there is not a “one size fits all approach” to a protection plan. The
framework presented in this thesis is an overall qualitative approach with quantitative
information within the system to support the theory. The five part framework is as follows:
•

Understanding the problem

•

Problem Analysis

•

Choose an appropriate turnaround strategy

•

Implementation of change process

•

Monitoring of change process

22

4.1 Understanding the problem
Having identified a need or a problem, the first phase of any investigation is to
understand it in the context in which it occurs. The difficulty in risk management for disasters is
that they are unpredictable by nature and many are so unimaginable that they are disregarded due
to their rare occurrence. A good first step is to specify the objectives of the project. As simple
as this step sounds it may be difficult because individuals approach situations differently. The
entire process can go wrong because those in charge may assume everyone involved sees the
situation and its resolution the same way. Knowledge of the fundamentals is very important.
Knowing the mechanisms of a system, its functions, and the probability of its failure modes will
help. Fault tree analysis is an exceptional technique that can be utilized in this process.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an approach of quantitative and qualitative risk analysis used
for evaluating the likelihood, consequences, and risk of unfavorable events. This concept is
based on two assumptions. The first being the likelihood of the input events and the latter is the
assumption regarding the interdependence among the events.

FTA develops a logical

relationship among the events leading to an accident and estimate the risk associated with the
accident [13]. FTA describes the consequences of an event and the likelihood of possible
outcomes. An event corresponds to any of the possible states a physical system can assume, or
any of the possible predictions of a model describing the system. By providing a detailed
analysis of outcomes it helps reduce the probability of occurrence and reduces the effects of all
associated consequences. The FTA represents the dichotomous conditions (e.g., success/failure,
true/false, or yes/no) of the initiating event until the subsequent events lead to the final outcome
events [13]. Uncertainties arise during this process and can be controlled by appropriate data
collection and expert judgment. Usually, uncertainties in the real world include two parts:
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stochastic uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. Stochastic uncertainty arises from the variance
of the event itself and epistemic uncertainty arises from ignorance about the subject matter [14].
Reducing stochastic uncertainty can be accomplished by performing a quantitative assessment of
variance by using classic theories of precise probabilities.

Expanding knowledge and

information on the subject matter helps reduce epistemic uncertainty.
Probabilistic approaches enable variation and uncertainty to be quantified in risk
assessment. In order to get a dependable analysis it is imperative to accurately illustrate and
represent uncertainty. Imprecise probability is applicable when information is scarce or when it
is not practical or feasible to collect information. Therefore available information is used to
carry out the proposed analysis. The information is used to generate upper and lower previsions,
which are then used to construct a set of probability measures. Existing probability distributions
will be considered for the analysis thus, making the upper and lower previsions capture the
available information without losing or distorting any available piece of information [14].

4.2 Problem Analysis
Once the crisis has been properly identified and all probable outcomes have been
determined, the next step is to establish how to solve the problem. This step is the process
responsible for controlling the lifecycle of all problems. After the FTA has taken place the
subsequent step is to prioritize the severity of the events in order to trace the problem. In terms
of critical infrastructure we can ask questions such as:
•

How much will it cost to fix the problem?

•

How long will it take to fix the problem?
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•

How many people will be affected during the recovery time?
The costs associated with infrastructure repair are taken into account during the planning

phase of design. Yearly maintenance, replacement and rehabilitation costs are accounted for in
the life cycle cost analysis. In the event of a disaster infrastructure is considered a public facility
under Sec. 102 Definitions (42 U.S.C. 5122) of the Robert T. Stafford disaster relief and
emergency assistance act [15], and is therefore eligible for emergency federal assistance. The
amount of federal aid provided by the government is directly proportional to the degree of
damage caused by the disaster.
The timetable associated with disaster relief is impossible to determine and is again
directly proportional to the amount of damage. This can however be tied into the time that it
takes to receive federal aid and mobilization efforts of volunteer organizations and communities.
A community’s preparedness system is the ability to identify hazards and develop
communication plans in the event of an emergency. A more organized and aware community
will be able to withstand and react appropriately before, during and after a disaster.

4.3 HAZUS MH Overview
What would happen if a 500-year flood hit a community? How can the costs of a levee
or other flood protection measures be justified? These are all questions that must be answered in
the mitigation process for disaster planning. HAZUS MH (Hazards United States- Multi Hazard)
is a program that combines science, mathematics and engineering with a GIS based interface to
determine the social, economic and physical impacts of a natural disaster. The three natural
hazards allowed to be explored using this program include earthquakes, hurricane winds and
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floods. For the purpose of this study the flood module was utilized. HAZUS-MH is not an
engineering tool; rather it is used as an aid in the hazard analysis and mitigation process. It uses
a state of the art geographic information system (GIS) in the form of ESRI’s ArcGIS platform to
map hazards as well as estimate damage and economic loss associated with said hazards. The
estimates determined in HAZUS are used for decision making in emergency preparedness and
recovery planning as well as developing mitigation plans. HAZUS-MH utilizes a five step
approach to enable the user to “Know Your Risk”. Once the risks are understood, informed
decisions can be made to protect the community and improve resiliency. Figure 4 shows a
graphic of the five step approach utilized in the program.

Figure 4 - HAZUS-MH 5 Step Approach [16]

4.4 Model Inputs
The analysis conducted in HAZUS-MH is used to generate maps and estimate exposure
to hazards. Existing data within the program was used in aid of a level 1 analysis. This entails
default national data stored within the program to perform a loss estimate. User supplied data
was added when necessary. The first thing that needs to be defined in HAZUS-MH is the study
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region and type of hazard to be studied. The specific study region used for this paper will be
described in detail in the case study section. HAZUS-MH allows the user to define the study
region based on various geographic levels including: state, county, census tract, census block,
and watershed boundaries. Once the appropriate study region is selected, a map displaying the
region is generated within the program. Careful examination is necessary to determine that the
appropriate region has been chosen for analysis. The base map of the study region is used to
break the information in later analysis into applicable terms. In order to perform any hydrologic
or hydraulic analysis a digital elevation model (DEM) must be imported. A DEM is a 3D model
representation of the terrain or topography data. Usually formed from either raster (a grid of
squares) or TIN (triangular irregular network) data, the closer together the grids points, the more
precise the information will be in the file. The DEMs used in HAZUS-MH are produced from
the U.S. Geological Survey 30-m resolution. An example of a 30-m DEM is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 - Sample DEM USGS [17]
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For improved estimates of damage, additional model input data for HAZUS-MH can be
broken into two categories: aggregate data and site-specific data. Aggregate data includes
general building stock (building distribution in a community based on usage and construction
materials), demographic data (age, income, sex, household, etc.), agricultural data (statistics
associated with crop valuation and production) and vehicle data (valuations and counts of
vehicles). Site-specific data includes essential facilities (police stations, fire stations, emergency
operations centers, schools, and medical facilities), lifelines (utilities and transportation) and high
potential loss facilities [18]. Parcel tax data can also be added to the model to get a detailed
community assessment. For larger study areas such as regions, national data is used but for a
smaller community evaluation it is best to add local data.

4.5 Choose an appropriate turnaround strategy
A turnaround strategy is part of a business principle entitled turnaround management.
This process involves an introspective glance into a company that acknowledges its problems
and considers a different strategy in the way the business is ran. The problems facing the
organization can be financial, management style, operational, etc.

Outside consultants are

brought into the company to perform a comprehensive review to determine the issues. The
company is then given a plan that involves suggested methods of improvement as well as
forecasts for future projections. Basically a turnaround strategy is a well thought out plan for
improvements for future successes. Choosing a turnaround strategy for the improvement of
infrastructure and emergency planning is a step forward in terms of improving the current state
in addition to learning from the past to ensure a prepared future.
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Developing a framework to analyze a problem is a good start to establish the source of an
issue. In order to fully understand something, an in depth analysis is necessary. Chapter 5
discusses mitigation strategies to combat the effects of flooding on infrastructure and
surrounding communities.
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CHAPTER 5
MITIGATION STRATEGIES

5.1 Response
As soon as there is an imminent threat to a region it is up to emergency officials to act
accordingly. Conducting a risk assessment is the first step to identify potential emergency
scenarios. An understanding of what can happen will help determine how to allocate resources
and develop a plan.

The first priority in emergency response is safety and the second is

stabilization of the incident. This phase is the implementation of the disaster plan. It focuses
primarily on providing aid, minimizing the damage to essential facilities, meeting the basic
requirements of the impacted population, and providing spiritual and mental health care to those
in need. Individuals who have prior experience with floods and proper warning time are more
likely to respond effectively in the presence of imminent danger.

The following sections

describe how warning time, transportation exposure and shelter requirements help in the
response to a natural disaster.

5.2 Warning Time
An effective warning system can play a large part in the protection from exposure to
natural hazards. In fact one of the most effective measures for disaster preparedness is a wellfunctioning early warning system. Although many hazards seem to appear randomly without
much warning most disasters have long gestation periods during which warnings accumulate. It
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is often a decision left up to the officials on whether the signals are legitimate concerns or false
warnings. According to several sources, there are four key elements to an effective early
warning system: risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, dissemination and
communication and response capability.
Assessing the risks and vulnerability before disaster strikes is an effective way to warn
citizens in harm’s way.

This evaluation is usually based on historical data and field

observations. The simulations performed for the case study include flood mapping and the
estimated damages associated with the return period. Mapping gives an approximate location of
where the damage will occur according to depth of water. The associated map of thematic depth
shows the depth of water at each location. As noted before, the depth of water helps determine
the damage as it relates to the structure and its contents. Figure 6 shows an example of the
thematic map depicting the depth of water after the flood event.
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Figure 6 - Thematic Map of 500 Year Flood

Once the risk assessment has taken place the next step in early warning systems is
monitoring the hazard. Scientific data that is risk based is necessary to evaluate risks and their
probability of occurrence. GIS technology such as the program used in this study is essential to
determining the exact location of damage along with figuring out the scope of the disaster.

5.3 Transportation Exposure
Mobility is a very important aspect of disaster response. Transportation is used by the
population for evacuation purposes and by emergency responders to rescue immobilized
individuals. If roads and bridges are inundated alternative routes must be designated for proper
evacuation. Evacuation is the urgent and rapid movement of people away from the threat or
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actual occurrence of a hazard. Before evacuation takes place there is a period called “Pre
Movement Time” where certain planning methods take place. The detection phase is first and
immediately following is the decision phase. Emergency planners evaluate the hazard and make
the decision on whether to evacuate or not. Once the decision is made the next step is alarm.
This is the step in the process when the information is given to the general public usually in
emergency broadcast form or by actual alarms and sirens. The next step in the process is the
reaction by the populace. Rarely is evacuation absolutely mandatory and there are usually
citizens that refuse to leave their property. This decision is also based on one’s perception of
danger or complete denial of the situation. The reaction time to a hazard varies depending on the
scale of the disaster. Evacuees need time to warn loved ones, develop personal evacuation plans
and protect their personal valuables and home. Once those decisions have been made the next
step involves movement to an area of refuge. Depending on the area, movement can be an
especially difficult phase of evacuation. Certain individuals of the population are immobilized
due to lack of personal transportation and being handicapped.

Demand increases on

transportation infrastructure systems that may be inundated or out of use due to damage from the
storm. Alternative routes must be designated for efficient and safe evacuation.
Linear programming is a specific method of mathematical optimization that allows the
user to come up with the best possible outcome in a given mathematical model. A good
representation of this method is the optimization of routes on a transportation network. In the
time of crisis finding the shortest path to an emergency center or shelter or delivering supplies to
these places is often a matter of life or death. This method is often used by GPS systems and
maps to give the user the shortest path from a single source to a destination. This concept was
created by Edsger W. Dijkstra [19] and it is called the weighted digraph. This method only
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works when all weights within the problem are positive. The basic steps in solving this type of
problem are:
1. Identify the variables
2. Define the constraints
3. Define the objective function
Consider the following example.
There has been a request for evacuation from an area due to the effects of inundation and
rising flood waters. There is an emergency evacuation center about 20 miles from the starting
location and the emergency planners want to tell the evacuees the best route for relocation. The
diagram of the road network is shown below. A similar example was presented by Brandon
Foltz on his educational website [20].

Figure 7- Diagram of Road Network for Evacuation Example
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As you can see in Figure 7, this is a complicated network that begins at the source destination
and ends at the emergency center. The best method of solving this problem is using the Dijkstra
method of linear programming. First the variables need to be identified. The variables are the
distances from the starting point to the emergency center. These variables will be alternated
within the algorithm to find the shortest or minimized route to the destination.
constraints need to be determined.

Next the

There is a net flow within the network that gives the

information about the shortest route. The source node is the supply node. This node starts the
algorithm therefore it gives the network the object. Therefore the source node value is one. All
of the connector nodes are used to feed net flow within the program. The value at each of these
nodes is zero because the information does not stop at these nodes it only passes through to get to
its destination.

Finally the emergency center is the destination or demand node so the

information is going into this node and nothing is outgoing therefore its value is negative one.
The constraints for this system are so that the net flow of the system is equal to the supply and
demand of the system. The objective function is to find the shortest or cheapest path to the
destination. Microsoft Excel was utilized to solve this problem. First the nodes were put into
Excel showing their origin and their destination nodes along with the distances associated with
each move. Next the supply and demand is set up so that it is equal to the net flow of the system.
Figure 8 shows a diagram of the layout for this problem.
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Figure 8 - Excel Setup for Evacuation Route Problem

Appendix A has the step by step instructions on how to solve this problem in Excel. As shown
above, the shortest route from the source destination to the emergency center is C-E-G with a
total distance of 18 miles. This sort of problem can also be used to distribute the goods among
emergency centers and the optimal route to get them there. Once evacuees have arrived at the
evacuation shelters it is up to the trained professionals there to have adequate space reserved and
proper care for the injured.
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5.4 Recovery
Recovery efforts rely heavily on the scale of the disaster and the immediate assessment of
damages incurred. Another consideration to take in the recovery process is what standard are
you recovering to? Are the efforts made going back to status quo before disaster struck or are
measures taken to improve future resilience to disasters? Businesses and communities that
remain the same over time set themselves up to be vulnerable to the impacts of disasters. In a
constantly changing world, society must also change in response in order to preserve an
advantage. When the focus is placed on resilience over recovery, communities stand a better
chance of reducing future damages caused by storms. In literature there are two primary kinds of
resilience: engineering and ecological. Engineering resilience refers to the speed of return to a
steady state after a system perturbation; and ecological resilience is defined as the magnitude of
disturbance that can be absorbed before the system restructures, which implies a focus on
maintaining existence of function [21]. Looking at the definitions for both engineering and
ecological resilience it is interesting to think about which type infrastructure systems should aim
for.

Engineering resilience refers to the return to the pre-disturbed state of a system but

ecological illustrates a system that absorbs and responds naturally to perturbation and ultimately
adjusts to its changing environment. So if a system were to increase its ecological resilience it
would increase the amount of damage a system could sustain before it experiences a complete
shutdown. Mitigation starts at the local level, however, monetary assistance usually comes from
the federal government as well as the state level. There has to be a new way of funding recovery
efforts that focuses on pre event planning more than the post event reconstruction.
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5.5 Federal and State Assistance
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [15] was
introduced in 1988 as an amended version of the Disaster Relief act of 1974. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) watches for potential disasters and emergency situations. They work
in accordance with local state emergency operations centers to determine the level of threat after
advanced warning systems have shown imminent disaster. The DHS will dispatch emergency
field personnel to the affected area to verify the damage incurred. The Governor of the affected
state must work in accordance with FEMA under the direct execution of the State’s emergency
plan. They must provide an estimate of the damage in the form of a preliminary damage
assessment (PDA) conducted by State and Federal officials.

Once this is completed the

Governor must write to the President giving the estimate of damage and the amount of assistance
needed.

If the request is warranted the President gives an official declaration of disaster

therefore activating any Federal programs that are designed to provide emergency aid. The
Stafford Act gives FEMA the responsibility to carry out the associated relief efforts. These
funds are only provided in addition to local relief efforts that have been overwhelmed by the
demand. This program is not without its criticisms. For instance, the Stafford Act states that if
destroyed buildings are to be repaired with Federal funds it must be built exactly the same as
before. For example, if a 100 year old building is destroyed it must be replaced by a building
exactly the same with no upgrades. What is to become of this building if another disaster is to
destroy it again? Although there are amendments within the Stafford Act that provides funds for
pre-disaster mitigation there needs to be a more effective financing option for disaster mitigation
and relief. A thirty year average (1982-2011) conducted by the National Weather Service shows
that flood damages in the United States costs $8.20 billion per year [22]. This average only
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accounts for direct losses associated with flood damages. Business related losses and regional
losses are indirect losses related to the lack of mobility due to the infrastructure damage incurred.
Various industries use transportation infrastructure to deliver their goods and people use them to
get to work. The longer infrastructure is out of service or functioning at a lower capacity the
economy suffers severe losses. Mitigation costs are also considered indirect flood-related costs.
Funding for both flood mitigation and infrastructure repair has to undergo drastic changes in
order to keep individual communities safe from disaster and increase regional economic vitality.

5.6 Mitigation & Preparation
No matter what type of flooding occurs there are loads that cause damages related to
various structures.

These loads are generally broken into three categories: impact loads,

hydrodynamic loads and hydrostatic loads.
Impact loads are those resulting from floating debris or any floatable object or mass
carried by flood waters that strike against buildings or structures. These loads are especially
destructive because the forces associated may be an order of magnitude higher than those of
hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads. Impact loads are broken into three categories: normal
impact loads, which result from isolated impact from normally encountered objects, special
impact loads, which result from large objects and extreme impact loads, which result from very
large objects floating in floodwaters. It is customary to account for normal and special impact
loads in flood impacted areas. It is not justifiable to always account for extreme impact loads
unless there is a high probability that structures in that area will be exposed to extreme impact
loads during the design flood. There have been several studies conducted for the purpose of
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modeling impact forces associated with flood waters. One of the most commonly used equations
is as shown in Equation 1 [23]:

Equation 1 - Impact Force
 



(1)



Where : Fi = impact force in lb acting at the Stillwater level
w = weight of the object in lb
V = velocity of water in ft/sec or approximated by 1 2

1⁄2

g = gravitational constant (32.2 ft/sec2)
ds = design stillwater flood depth in feet
T = duration of impact in seconds
This is just an equation of approximation that contains several uncertainties that must be
quantified before the impact of debris loading on the building can be determined. The design
stillwater depth is the vertical distance between the eroded ground elevation and the stillwater
elevation associated with the design flood. The items to be quantified are as follows:
•

Size, shape and weight (w) of the waterborne object

•

Flood velocity (V)

•

Velocity of the object compared to the flood velocity

•

Portion of the building that will be struck and the most vulnerable portion of the building
where failure could mean collapse

•

Duration of the impact (T)
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Hydrostatic loads are those caused by water either above or below the ground surface,
free or confined, which is either stagnant or moves at very low velocities, or up to five feet per
second. Hydrostatic loads are both lateral (pressures) and vertical (buoyant) in nature. The
lateral pressures result from differences in interior and exterior water surface elevations. These
pressures are usually not great enough to cause permanent deflections unless there is a
substantial elevation difference between the inside and outside water elevations. The vertical
loads are those acting downward on horizontal or inclined surfaces of structures. When the
buoyant forces of the flood waters exceed those of the building and its contents the structure will
float away from its foundation. Although these types of forces are highly improbable the
buoyant forces can cause a problem with saturated soils beneath the foundation which can lead to
cracking and other foundation related problems.
Hydrodynamic loads are those that act on buildings or structures by the flow of flood
water moving at moderate or high velocity around buildings or structures above ground level.
These loads are carried from upstream flow and drag on the sides of the structure and create a
negative suction pressure at the rear of the structure.

The magnitude of the forces created on

each side of the structure is directly related to the velocity of the flood waters and the shape of
the structure. Just like hydrostatic loads the lateral loads on the building may be capable of
causing walls to collapse but only in extreme cases.
Mitigation is necessary to reduce the damages that are associated with these flood loads.
Engineers are brought in after the flood event has taken place to determine the extent of damage
caused and determine the correct method of repair. Once the damages have been totaled the
reconstruction phase can begin. This phase can also be thought of as the pre-disaster event for
the next major storm that may hit the area. It is very important to use this opportunity to learn
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from past mistakes, correct them and put the community in a better position for future hazards.
There are various methods used in the mitigation process. The following sections discuss
methods associated with various soft and hard engineering practices.

5.7 Soft Engineering
Soft engineering is the practice of using ecological principles to reduce erosion and
achieve stabilization of shorelines.

This method works with the natural processes of the

environment to reduce the effects of flooding while improving the habitat and saving money.
Compared to hard engineering this method is a lot cheaper to implement and maintain over the
long run and it tends to be more aesthetically pleasing. In addition to the lower economic costs
soft engineering practices are better for the environment because they work with natural
structures that mature over time to reduce the effects of flooding. River edges and shorelines are
improved by using vegetation and other materials to soften the land-water interface. By doing so
the ecological attributes of each are improved without compromising the engineered integrity.
Afforestation is one of the most popular methods of soft engineering which entails creating a
new forest where none has existed before. By planting trees in the upper region of the drainage
basin they can catch and store the additional water from flooding which helps reduce the risk of
the river becoming overwhelmed. Afforestation is not a guaranteed method to prevent flooding
and it also takes a lot of time to see its benefits and large amounts of open land. The costs
associated with this method include purchase of land in the flood basin.
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5.8 Hard Engineering
Although soft engineering has many environmental and economic advantages local
governments tend to favor hard engineering practices due to their often instant flood control and
job creating potential. It often takes years for the effects of soft engineering practices to become
effective within a community and there is never a solid guarantee that they will effectively
reduce flooding. Hard engineering practices tend to alter the natural landscape in a controlled
disruption manner by using man-made structures. Other practices of hard engineering change
the landscape of rivers to make them suitable for flood control. The most commonly used hard
engineering practices are dams and levees. With exception to the Great Wall of China, dams are
the largest structures ever built around the world. They are used to generate power, prevent
droughts and flooding just to name a few. The tremendous costs of constructing dams are hardly
justifiable unless there is a major flooding problem within an area and a market to harvest
hydropower. Depending on the type of dam, costs associated with new construction can exceed
one billion dollars and the average costs overrun of dams is 56%. Since the 1980’s new
construction of dams has slowed down due to the fact that most of the appropriate locations for
these structures have already been developed. The current problem facing the United States is
that by the year 2020 85% of the dams will be more than 50 years old and in serious need of
repair. If the funding is not set in place and repair targets are not met, this poses a major
flooding issue for much of the United States. If some of the dams are not economically viable
for repair they will be demolished. Due to the nature that dams completely change an ecosystem
and disrupt the natural flow of rivers demolishing a structure this large will likely cause adverse
effects to the surrounding region.
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For the purposes of flood control there are more economically viable options in hard
engineering tactics in the form of levees. A levee is a natural or artificial flood barrier used to
protect communities from unwanted water. Also known as a dike or storm barrier, a levee can
be found along lakes, rivers or by the sea. Natural levees are created when a river floods over
the bank and deposits sediments, silts and other materials along the bank which causes it to be
slightly elevated from the river bed and the floodplain.

The banks form levees made of

sediment, silt, and other materials pushed aside by flowing water. Levees are usually parallel to
the way the river flows, so they can help divert the flow of the river. The main function of a
levee is to control floodwaters. They can also be used to contain water flow, increase water
speed and divert water from riverbeds for agricultural purposes and increase habitable land.
Levees are generally made of earthen materials such as clay with some man-made levees being
reinforced by rocks or concrete to prevent erosion. In many places where the flow of the river is
strong, levees may also be made of blocks of wood, plastic or metal. Where the area beside a
river or body of water is in particular danger, levees may even be reinforced by concrete. Levees
can be permanent structures to protect inundation areas or emergency constructions built for a
flood emergency. In emergency situations, levees can be made of sandbags. Levees can also be
artificially created or reinforced. Artificial levees are usually built of piling soil, sand or rocks
on a cleared level surface. Artificial levees need to be protected as they have to stand up to
factors such as erosion.
There is no set height for levee systems as they are designed and modified for the area
where it is constructed and the desired level of flood control. For this reason the price range
varies depending on the materials used, the location and the purchase of private land. Typical
earthen levee costs can range roughly $4,000 - $8,000 per linear foot. For coastal areas that
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require many miles of levee systems and reinforcement by stronger materials the projects are
difficult to get funded. Although no one can argue about the benefits of flood control, it is often
a hard task in convincing taxpayers and legislators to increase funding. But if a levee breaks, the
consequences can be devastating.
A levee failure occurs when a break, also known as a breach occurs.

Levees are

generally added onto every couple of decades and are not given the same engineering precision
as other hydraulic structures which leave much to be desired during emergency flood situations.
This lack of care leads to failures within a levee system. It only takes one break to flood an
entire area. There are many ways a levee can fail but most failures are attributed to one of the
following as described in Table 2.
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Table 2 Levee Failure Mechanisms [24]
Failure Mechanism
Overtopping

Seepage

Levee Failure Mechanisms
Description
Caused when the floodwaters exceed the lowest crest of the levee
system and go over to the land side of the levee which cause flooding
damages. This failure mechanism can lead to landside erosion or a
complete breakdown of the system.
Seepage occurs when water makes its way through the permeable soils
used for the levee which leads to erosion from the inside out. This
failure can be combated by allowing proper drainage within the
system.

During periods of high water, the waves generated by the wind will
cause surface erosion of the water side of the levee.
Occurs when large slabs of the levee slide during or immediately after
Shear Failure (Slope Instability)
periods of high water. If the level of water stays high for many days
the surface of the levee will become saturated leading to a loss of
surface cohesion and the surface layer sliding down the levee.
During a flood the water column exerts a weight upon the levee sides
Piping and Under-Seepage
and adjacent floodplain that pushes water into any holes or cracks in
the levee structure. If the water reaches the landside of the levee it will
flow from the levee and carry levee material with it, resulting in the
levee eroding from the inside out. Flood water flows through
permeable soil material that underlies the levee. The water arises to the
surface near the landside base of the levee in what is termed a ”boil”.
Again, the water is flowing, so it is carrying levee foundation material
out from under the levee.
Sideways hydrostatic pressure, which essentially “pushes over” the
Hydrostatic Pressure
levee from the high water side. This usually means that the levee is not
massive enough.
Source: Information Adapted from RiverPartners.org

Erosion

Other failure mechanisms of levee systems can be attributed to things such as poor maintenance
and lack of funding. Due to their fundamental purpose levees are systems that are rarely used
because of the rarity of flooding in certain areas but they must be ready to protect in emergency
situations. For this reason local governments may not feel the urgency to fund maintenance and
repair projects until it is absolutely necessary. That is why it is important to incorporate the
natural aspects of soft engineering into hard engineering practices to make them more
sustainable.
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The aftermath of major storm surges have civil engineers from the United States looking
to the Dutch to improve current conditions. The Netherlands are surrounded by water on three
sides with more than half of the country below sea level. A storm in 1953 that broke 500 levees
and killed 2,000 people was the wake-up call the Netherlands needed. Since then they have
installed a network of dams, canal pumps, levees, and storm surge barriers to keep the water of
the North Sea out. It is arguably the best protected low-land area in the world using 10,000 year
design flood elevations. The levees were replaced with storm barriers. As the waters rise during
a storm event, computers close the walls and fill the tanks along the barrier causing the walls to
sink to the bottom keeping the water away from the land. They have incorporated engineering
practices that include absorbing water into marsh plains, fiber optics and electronic sensors in
their monitoring systems and projections 200 years into the future based on current climate
control patterns. Perhaps their most ambitious project was the construction of the Oosterschelde
barrier. This barrier has several layers which include a beam under which water flows when the
gates are open, a steel gate that is lowered when the sea level reaches danger height, a 5-million
ton stone block beam steadies giant piers which have holes that fill with sand and a synthetic
mattress filled with sand and gravel to strengthen the nearby sea floor [25]. The system built by
the Dutch is a marvel of hydraulic engineering and a testament of the determination to keep their
constituents safe. A key factor to point out is their government and citizens are willing to pay to
keep their country safe. They are more than happy to pay the taxes to keep their system up to
date because they look at it as their survival method.
There is no one method to solve the issues surrounding emergency preparedness. Natural
disasters are only increasingly in magnitude and frequency and until the nation as a whole makes
a decision to increase protection there will always be vulnerable populations and infrastructure
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systems. As history tells us the economic vitality of the nation is dependent upon the continuity
of services provided by infrastructure, a vibrant workforce and regional economies; all of which
are threatened by the impacts of natural disasters. There will almost certainly never come a time
when disasters can be completely coped with but employing a continuous cycle of mitigation,
learning from past mistakes and designing more sustainable protection will lead to a prepared
future.

Chapter 6 provides background on urban floods, discusses fault tree analysis,

urbanization and climate change and the role they both play in the increase in urban flooding. A
fault tree analysis is performed to determine the root causes of urban flooding.
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CHAPTER 6
FAULT TREE, URBANIZATION & URBAN FLOODS

6.1 Flooding & Urban Floods
Water is the elixir of life. Since the beginning of mankind humans have found it to be
desirable to live close to bodies of water. Water provides a means to tend to agriculture,
waterways for transportation, energy sources, consumption, recreation activities amongst its
many other uses. The disadvantage of living close to water is that the levels often change and
high amounts of water flowing often leads to flooding. Flooding is a natural phenomenon that
occurs when the quantity of water in a stream, river or lake exceeds the capacity and overflows
to the adjacent land. It is one of the most common and costly types of natural disasters. The
following sections will explain the hydrology of flooding as well as the frequency of certain
types of floods.
Over the last several decades the United States as well as other countries around the
world has become increasingly more urbanized. For the first time in history over half of the
world’s population lives in cities and towns. Urbanization brings forth economic growth, city
expansion and higher population density rates in once rural areas. This can lead to a number of
positive effects improving job markets, education, transportation as well as many other social
and economic programs. Of all of the positive effects of urban expansion it can also have
negative effects on the environment. Because of the effects of urbanization new development
gives rise to the concrete world of buildings, roads, and infrastructure all made of impermeable
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materials. This disrupts the natural drainage area in a floodplain which leads to a specific type of
flooding called urban flooding. Although several factors attribute to urban flooding such as
snowmelt, river, coastal, and flash floods this type is specific due to a lack of drainage in an
urban area. Human factors are the basis of urban flooding. As urbanization grows the natural
landscape of a floodplain is replaced by new development. During rainfall water is absorbed into
the soil as groundwater and is slowly discharged into streams over time. In natural situations the
water is absorbed through vegetation, grasslands and depressions in the ground. Impermeable
surfaces reduce the amount of surface area for infiltration of the surface water to groundwater to
occur. This causes large volumes of overland flow water to move quickly into a stream or river.
In an urban environment water infrastructure such as storm sewers and drainage systems must
carry this water to its proper destination. When the surface water does not have a way to the soil
the storm systems become overwhelmed and increase the runoff to nearby streams. Once water
enters a drainage network, it flows faster than it would under normal circumstances leading to
flooding conditions that are occurring more frequently and severely in nature.
Because urban areas have higher populations and economic activity the amount of
damage caused by floods can be very severe. Roads become inundated with water and people
cannot travel to work and other destinations, business interruptions occur, damage to buildings
and residential areas all add up to large economic losses. Many of these new developments are
built in areas of the floodplain prone to extensive flooding. There are laws and regulations to
prevent such development but they are often overlooked for monetary or political reasons
leading to an increased risk for the inhabitants. According to FEMA, 20-25% of economic
damage caused by flooding occurs in areas not designated as being in a floodplain. A sound
understanding of the probability of occurrence is an essential step in dealing with flood risk.
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When engineers are designing structures they are concerned with floods in terms of their
probability of exceedance. The probability of exceedance describes the likelihood of a specified
flow rate (or volume of water with specified duration) being exceeded in a given year. [26]
Scientists and engineers use statistical probability to put a context to floods and their occurrence.
If the probability of a particular flood magnitude being equaled or exceeded is known, then risk
can be assessed [27]. It is important to note that the return period varies by catchment area,
width of the floodplain, climate of the region and other factors. The return period is explained as
the annual exceedance probability later in the section. The most common design flood is the 100
year flood also known as the base flood. It is used as the basis for the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) for delineation of Special Flood Hazard Areas on Digitized Flood Insurance
Rate Maps as described in the next section. This is a flood event that has a 1% probability of
occurring in a given year meaning it has a return rate of 100 years. Figure 9 shows an illustration
of a typical 100 year floodplain.
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Figure 9 - 100 Year Floodplain [28]

`It
It is understood that this does not mean that this event will occur every 100 years rather it has
the probability of occurrence depending on the available data. This term is used to simplify the
definition of the flood. For example, when constructing a hhome
ome in a 100 year flood plain the
developers want to know the probability of a 100 year flood event occurring over a period of 30
years. This is known as the design risk or exceedance probability, Pe, which can be calculated
using Equation 2.
Equation 2 - Exceedance Probability
(2)
Where Pe is the probability of exceedance, R is the design risk, n is the number of years and T is
the return period. So by this method the probability of a 100 year event occurring in a 30 year
period is 26%.
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There are three different ways to describe the annual exceedance probability as shown in Table
3.
Table 3 Annual Exceedance Probability
AEP (as percent)

AEP (as probability)

50%
20%
10%
4%
2%
1%
0.2%

0.50
0.20
0.10
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.002

Annual Recurrence Interval
(ARI)
2-year
5-year
10-year
25-year
50-year
100-year
500-year

6.2 FEMA Special Flood Hazard Area
A special flood hazard area (SFHA) is the land areas that are high risk for flooding and
require mandatory purchase of flood insurance. The SFHA includes Zones A, AO, AH, A1-30,
AE, A99, AR, AR/A1-30, AR/AE, AR/AO, AR/AH, AR/A, B, C, D, X, VO, V1-30, VE, and V
and are described in Tables 4 through 7.

Table 4 FEMA Moderate to Low Risk Areas [29]
ZONE
B and X (shaded)

C and X (unshaded)

DESCRIPTION
Area of moderate flood hazard, usually the area between the limits of the 100year and 500-year floods. Are also used to designate base floodplains of lesser
hazards, such as areas protected by levees from 100-year flood, or shallow
flooding areas with average depths of less than one foot or drainage areas less
than 1 square mile.
Area of minimal flood hazard, usually depicted on Flood insurance rate maps
(FIRMs) as above the 500-year flood level.
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Table 5 FEMA High Risk Areas [29]
ZONE

DESCRIPTION

A

Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year
mortgage. Because detailed analyses are not performed for such areas; no depths or base flood
elevations are shown within these zones.

AE

The base floodplain where base flood elevations are provided. AE Zones are now used on new
format FIRMs instead of A1-A30 Zones.

A1-30

These are known as numbered A Zones (e.g., A7 or A14). This is the base floodplain where the
FIRM shows a Base flood elevation (BFE) (old format).

AH

Areas with a 1% annual chance of shallow flooding, usually in the form of a pond, with an average
depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30year mortgage. Base flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected
intervals within these zones.
River or stream flood hazard areas, and areas with a 1% or greater chance of shallow flooding each
year, usually in the form of sheet flow, with an average depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas
have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Average flood depths derived
from detailed analyses are shown within these zones.
Areas with a temporarily increased flood risk due to the building or restoration of a flood control
system (such as a levee or a dam). Mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements will apply,
but rates will not exceed the rates for unnumbered A zones if the structure is built or restored in
compliance with Zone AR floodplain management regulations.
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding that will be protected by a Federal flood control system
where construction has reached specified legal requirements. No depths or base flood elevations
are shown within these zones.

AO

AR

A99

Table 6 FEMA High Risk Coastal Areas [29]
ZONE

DESCRIPTION

V

Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with
storm waves. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. No
base flood elevations are shown within these zones.

VE, V1 - 30

Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with
storm waves. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Base
flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within these zones.
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Table 7 FEMA Undetermined Risk Areas [29]
ZONE
D

DESCRIPTION
Areas with possible but undetermined flood hazards. No flood hazard analysis has been
conducted. Flood insurance rates are commensurate with the uncertainty of the flood risk.

Once the probability of exceedance is determined it allows decision makers to interpolate
and extrapolate historical events from that particular region to determine the effects of future
hazards. To establish this, an assumption has to be made regarding the distribution of flood
frequency. It is well known that flood frequency is probability based because 100 year floods do
not occur just once in a hundred years. Sometimes these events happen rarely and other times
they can occur multiple years in a row. The effects of climate change are becoming increasingly
prevalent and these super storms and hazardous events are happening more and more frequently.
There is a direct correlation between the effects of urbanization and climate change. As
cities become industrialized they output the majority of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions
into the atmosphere. Along with emissions, urban areas create urban heat islands through the use
of heat storing structures and impermeable surfaces that retain heat. Rapid population growth in
these areas place a strain on its limited resources and already crumbling public infrastructure
making them least equipped to deal with climate change and other economic and social
struggles.

Cities are driving climate change and are the most vulnerable to its effects.

Metropolitan areas are susceptible to the rising sea level, extreme unpredictable weather
conditions and rising temperatures. Climate change not only affect coastal cities but inland
communities are faced with unstable hillsides and limited resources. Another troubling fact with
urbanization is that over the course of the 21st century the rate of industrialization is higher in
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less developed nations. This means that when these more frequent and destructive storms take
place these countries will have a lower capacity to deal with its effects and it will be up to more
developed nations to provide aid. Social and economic vitality is dependent upon the investment
in climate proof and resistant infrastructure investment. With more at stake in urban areas there
is also a greater chance of innovative ideas to come out of these areas to combat the changes that
are taking place.

Although it is important for local officials to come up with mitigation

techniques, there should be a call to higher offices for legislative measures.

Vulnerable

communities are only as vulnerable as they are prepared.
Urban flooding is a dangerous hazard that is increasingly causing more severe damage to
metropolitan areas around the world. It is very difficult to determine all of the sources of urban
flooding but it is important to try to find the root of the issue. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a
deductive analysis method that resolves an undesired event into its causes. This system is used a
lot in many fields but more specifically in reliability engineering to identify the best ways to
reduce risk or to determine event rates of a safety accident or a particular system level failure. It
helps analyze a problem and stimulates critical thinking to break down all of the components of
failure within a system and improves the overall understanding of the system. They are best
utilized when an undesired event leads to a large perceived threat of loss. The undesired event
must be already identified in order to begin the process. The analysis starts with a general
conclusion in the form of an undesired top event.

From there it is necessary to try and

understand a system and use technical information to determine possible causes for the undesired
event. For each fault it is necessary to list all of the possible causes leading to the top event. The
objective is to work toward a root cause for the top event. Once there is a firm understanding of
the system the next step is to construct the tree. Putting the information into a logical format on
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each level helps the user see if they really grasp the understanding of the system. After the tree
is constructed in a desirable manner the next step is validation and evaluation. This can be done
either quantitatively or qualitatively. This is where all possible hazards that affect the main event
directly or indirectly are listed. The final step in FTA is to interpret the results. What is the root
cause that leads up to the main event and how can this be prevented in the future? If there is no
single incident that leads to the main event a better understanding of the system will help risk
managers determine proper means of mitigation.
FTA depicts the events that lead up to an undesired event of hazard. There are symbols
used to depict the relationship between each level.

These symbols are broken into two

categories; event symbols and gate symbols. Event symbols are used for the initiating events and
the intermediate events that follow and ultimately the basic or primary events. The initiating and
basic events are known as the cause events and the intermediate are known as the fault events.
The gate symbols in FTA are the logic symbols that interconnect the events. The two most
commonly used gate symbols in a classical FTA are AND and OR gates. AND gates are used
when all components must fail in order for the system to fail. OR gates are used if any of the
events fail independently. Table 8 shows the diagram for each event and gate symbols along
with their descriptions.
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Table 8 FTA Symbols
Symbol Type
Initiating Event

Symbol

Description
The event being studied in the
FTA.

Intermediate Event

Used between initiating and
basic events. Need further
elaboration.

Basic Event

Error or failure to a system
component. Primary cause
with no further investigation.

AND Gate

Output event occurs only if all
input events occur.

OR Gate

The output event occurs if at
least one input event occurs.

The FTA conducted for this study will be centered on urban flooding so the initiating
event for the fault tree is an urban flood. As discussed previously the main causes of urban
flooding relate to a lack of drainage within the system. There are five intermediate events below
the initiating event that will be analyzed.

These events include inflow route interruption,

combined sewer overflow, separate sewer overflow, levee failure and sewer flooding. Each of
these events have several intermediate and basic events or causes that lead to their failure. The
full diagram of the FTA is shown in Figures 10 & 11.
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Figure 10 - FTA for Urban Flooding

59

Figure 11 - FTA for Urban Flooding (Continued)
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Although each of the events within the FTA are different the basic events that lead to the
failure of the urban flood system are similar in nature. Environmental factors such as seepage,
erosion, extensive rainfall, settlement and scour play a role in almost every event that leads to
failure. When the landscape changes from permeable soils to impermeable water has to find a
new route to the river system and it often flows faster through man-made reservoir systems and
the underground pipe network. Extensive rainfall during a disaster event overwhelms these
systems and leads to failure. It can be stated that human error is the main source of system
failure in urban flood protection. Inadequate design and failure to maintain and improve the
system leads to flooding crises. Water infrastructure networks in the United States were built
shortly after WWII and the cost of not replacing these systems is showing. There are an
approximate 240,000 water main breaks every year along with 75,000 sanitary sewer overflows.
Tree roots are infiltrating the systems causing line breaks and out of date materials are
deteriorating causing pipes to rupture. The ASCE 2013 infrastructure report estimates that a
total investment of $298 billion over the next twenty years is necessary to improve current
conditions with pipe networks needing the largest capital investment. The National Committee
on Levee Safety estimates that approximately $100 million is needed for investment as well as
the establishment of a national safety standard for construction. There is currently no precedence
set for safety on a national level as far as levee construction is concerned. Due to the number of
individuals and critical infrastructure that levees protect there is a need for legislation to control
design and construction. The National Levee Safety Act of 2007 developed recommendations
for plans regarding a national program but there has not been much progress made toward
implementing a system. Determining the root causes related to urban floods is the first step in
understanding how to alleviate damages and reduce risk. The key issue relating to disaster
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mitigation and reduction is the lack of funding given to the programs implemented to reduce
damages. It is important to realize the economic impacts of such disasters to open the minds of
those in charge as well as vulnerable populations to get a conversation started regarding
mitigation. Chapter 7 discusses the economic impacts of disasters.
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CHAPTER 7
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
7.1 Introduction
The case study presented in this thesis will be based on a flood event and how this event
can affect the surrounding region. A lot of times when a public project is presented to a
committee for approval it has to be justified economically using a benefit cost analysis. This
process is used for a number of reasons because public projects are intended to be nonprofit and
there is no standard used as a measure of financial effectiveness and the monetary impact of
many benefits of public sector projects is difficult to quantify. As the name implies, the benefit
cost ratio involves the calculation of a ratio of benefits to costs. All of the benefits and costs
associated with a project are quantified and used in the conventional or modified equations
shown in Equation 3:
Conventional B-C ratio with PW:
Equation 3 - Conventional Benefit Cost Ratio
 

       
 !"        

Where:
•

PW(*) = present worth of (*)

•

B = benefits of the proposed project
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•

I = initial investment in the proposed project

•

O&M = operating and maintenance costs of the proposed project

Modified B-C ration with PW:
Equation 4 - Modified Benefit Cost Ratio
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These methods are used as a way to make certain that the allocation of public funding is being
used effectively. With that being said, projects associated with the prevention of unforeseen
events are even more difficult to justify because these are situations that may or may not occur.
For example, the basis of a 100 year flood event, or base flood, is that its occurrence only has a
1% chance per year to transpire. If the costs of a project to replace the rip-rap on the bank of a
flood prone river exceeds historical flood insurance data for that area the project will not be
accepted. Many public leaders use the “wait and see” approach to disaster prevention and as
seen with recent storms such as hurricane Katrina and Sandy this approach leaves communities
devastated and surrounding regions are left feeling the effect as well.

The saved dollars

associated with disasters must be applied to the benefit of the project for validation. As is the
case with many public projects costs associated are both direct and indirect. It is no longer
feasible to look at the direct costs and dismiss the validity of a project because many times the
consequence of not acting on foreseen events outweighs the price.
As presented in chapter 3 quantifiable costs for disasters are broken into economic, social
and environmental pacts.

Many times the focus of disaster prevention is focused on one

particular area but it is important to look at how the aftermath affects the surrounding areas and
economies as well. Many projects are overseen by economists that use historical data as well as
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established rates to take all factors into account and answer certain questions. If a flood hits an
area and washes out a railway, what costs are associated with repairing the rail as well as lost
business during repair? If the interstate has to be shut down, how does it affect commercial as
well as personal travel? What is the lost revenue from potential airport flooding? Answering all
of these questions and more help put public projects into perspective and validate funding.
The damages that are incurred during and following a natural disaster have a significant
effect on the regional economy. In some cases, depending on the geographical location of the
disaster area and the severity of the event, the economic effects can be felt throughout the nation
and on a global scale. When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, the price of oil rose
because of the damages incurred by the storm and the Department of Energy was forced to tap
into emergency oil reserves. Determining the economic impacts from natural disasters is a fairly
imprecise science because of the complex interdependencies of all of the sectors affected, the
magnitude of the disaster and the differences in disaster type. In the case of a tornado, some
areas can be incalculably devastated while others in the proximity are left completely unscathed.
Another important factor that plays into the severity of the disaster is the population of the area
where the event takes place. Obviously a more densely populated area will cause greater
destruction and loss of life than a rural area. After the event has occurred insurance companies,
the public and private sector and various relief organizations must come together and assess the
damage to prepare for reconstruction and rehabilitation. An assortment of methodologies is used
to evaluate damages but they are often inconsistent and the findings lack focus. Also different
models use different assumptions which make it difficult to relate them to each other. A
framework for the economic evaluation of natural disasters has to come from a multi-discipline
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effort to reduce damages and improve resilience. The first step in economic evaluation is to
determine the kinds of losses and how to calculate each.

7.2 Losses
Losses are those economic values attached to items that are damaged during a natural
disaster event. A disaster, from an economic perspective, can be defined as a natural event that
causes a perturbation to the functioning of the economic system, with a significant negative
impact on assets, production factors, output, employment or consumption [30]. Determining the
losses associated with said disasters can become very tricky.

Losses calculated abruptly

thereafter tend to be an overestimation of the actual monetary values. This can be an effect of
looking at a disaster area for the first time and being overwhelmed without actually evaluating
the damages. Unfortunately, losses will never be estimated with full certainty but classifying
them according to their impact on society and the economy is a good way to start the evaluation.

7.3 Direct Losses
Direct losses are those associated with the immediate outcome of a natural disaster.
These losses are mostly related to the physical damage that occurs during and following an event
and the loss of the asset value. Direct losses are broken up into two categories or types. Primary
direct losses are those resulting from the immediate destruction of buildings, lifeline systems and
infrastructure caused by an event such as wind damage from a hurricane. Secondary direct
losses are those additional impacts resulting from follow-up physical destruction such as
accompanying water damage to structures from a flood event. Direct market losses are those that
are associated with damage to manufactured goods whose values can be easily determined.
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Perhaps the most important direct loss from natural disasters occurs in the loss of lives. There is
no way to place a value on a human life so this loss along with health and mental issues that arise
from disasters are direct non-market losses.

7.4 Indirect Losses
Indirect losses are those associated with the residual effects of a disaster event. These
losses can be related to decline in sales, wages, and profits of businesses, disrupted transportation
networks and loss of local tax revenue. Business disruption is a major problem in the aftermath
of a storm. When communications break down and disjointed transportation networks have yet
to be repaired local businesses shut down causing a rise in unemployment and a loss in revenue.
There are very few ways to determine the indirect losses associated with lost business.

7.5 Gains
Although it is difficult to imagine a positive arising from a natural disaster there can be
such in economic terms. Gains are encountered in the recovery and reconstruction period after
the disaster has taken place. It can be difficult for businesses that provide commodities and time
related goods and services to recover losses from lost production but industries such as
construction often see large gains post disaster.

7.6 Stages of Natural Disaster Management
Natural disaster management is a field of study that is being given a resurrection in recent
years due to an increase in large scale natural disasters brought about by climate change. There
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are many different schools of thought in terms of dealing with the effects of natural disasters and
until they are reviewed at all levels, global, national, regional, state and local, problems will
continue to arise and communities will remain vulnerable. Although there can be no go-to plan
for disaster management because no two disasters are alike a framework for creating disaster
awareness and preparedness is needed.

7.7 Awareness
The major reason people are caught off guard or not prepared for the impacts of a natural
disaster is their lack of awareness.

Individuals are generally miss-informed or completely

oblivious to the warnings presented to them. This underestimation of the oncoming event leads
to un-preparedness and numbness within a region. Flow of emergency goods, communications
and rescue becomes nearly impossible which leads to an increase in loss of life, public and
private property damage as well as slow recovery action. Warnings must be given in a timely
manner allowing people time to evacuate if necessary and they must be clear, concise, and
simple so that they are easily and readily understood by the surrounding population. The early
response warning system must be a top down warning process starting with the data collected by
the National Weather Service (NWS) being updated and presented in real time to local news,
radio, public servants and ultimately the exposed communities. Questions must be answered
regarding early warning and response systems in order to improve the process. What is the
hazard in question and how will this hazard be identified and evaluated? What are the current
methods being implemented? How do you measure the amount of time necessary for the
pertinent hazard type?
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The economic vitality of regions experiencing frequent natural disasters is dependent on
the efforts used to reduce the impacts of these events. The amount of money necessary for
mitigation is completely contingent on the individual needs of the community being explored.
Examination of needs can be determined by performing a case study. The next chapter presents
the case developed in this thesis to establish mitigation efforts.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDY

8.1 Case Study Overview
To test the effectiveness of the framework presented in this thesis a theoretical storm
surge is explored in the study region to determine both the damages caused and ways to mitigate
the situation. Flood simulations based on the 100, 500, and 1000 year return periods are
explored using HAZUS-MH and the riverine hazard scenario function. Based on the estimates
established from the program a benefit cost analysis will be used to determine the validity of the
mitigation measures. Public engineering projects must be economically justified in order to
come to fruition and the first step is to determine the hazard.

8.2 General Description of the Region
The primary location for this study is Hamilton County, TN and the surrounding region.
Hamilton County is located in Southeastern Tennessee and has a total area of 576 square miles.
Of this total area 542 square miles is land and 33 square miles is made up of water. It is the
fourth largest county in Tennessee and as of the 2000 Census, there were 307, 896 people,
124,444 households and 83,759 families residing in the county. The population density was 568
people per square mile. The data used for this analysis is based off of the 2000 Census to make
it compatible with the HAZUS-MH format.
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Figure 12 - Hamilton County Map [31]

Hamilton County includes two distinct geographic areas, the Cumberland Plateau and
Mountains and the Southern Appalachian Ridges and Valleys [32]. Soils in both of these areas
formed under forest vegetation and are dominantly light in color. The soils in the Cumberland
Plateau and Mountains are moderately deep over sandstone and shale bedrock. The soils in
Southern Appalachian Ridges and Valley are moderately deep or deep over limestone and shale
bedrock [33]. Hamilton County is divided from north to south by the Tennessee River and the
Chickamauga and Nickajack Reservoirs.
Hamilton County has a moderate climate with cool winters and hot summers. Abundant
sunshine and mild temperatures and rainfall characterize the fall and spring seasons.

The

average temperature for January is 39.4°F, for July, 79.6°F and an annual average of 60.5°F.
The average annual precipitation is 54.5 inches with March, July and December typically being
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the wettest months and September through November being the driest months. Figure 13 shows
the average monthly precipitation.

Monthly Precipitation Averages
Average Precipitation (In)
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Figure 13 - Monthly Precipitation Averages [34]

The average annual runoff in the region is about 23 inches, or 44 percent of the average
rainfall. The monthly average runoff varies from almost four inches in March to less than one
inch in August, September and October.
Generally, runoff is heaviest in winter and early spring when vegetation is dormant and
the ground is saturated. As a result, heavy storms moving across the Tennessee Valley region
between December and early May become potential causes of major floods [35].
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Hamilton County was chosen for this thesis because according to the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) the Chattanooga metropolitan area is the most flood prone area in the state of
Tennessee because of its location. The city sits in a low plain just above where the Tennessee
River passes through the Cumberland Mountains. The TVA flood control website explains the
Hamilton County flood area as follows:
Before TVA started flood control operations, major storms occurring
in the 21,400 square mile drainage area above Chattanooga would
cause the Tennessee River to rise rapidly. When it reached
Chattanooga, the swollen river would attempt to carry more water
through the narrow mountain gorge below the city that the river
channel would allow. The excess water that could not flow
immediately through the mountains would naturally back up into the
city, flooding it on average at least once a year [36].
In order to capture the geographic influences of this area, surrounding counties were
included in this study. The additional counties included were Marion and Bradley Counties in
Tennessee and Walker, Dade, and Catoosa Counties in Northern Georgia. The geographical size
of the study region is 2,152 square miles and contains 14,577 census blocks. Figure 10 below
shows a view of the study region. The region contains over 219 thousand households and has a
total population of 553,126 people. There are an estimated 243,876 buildings in the region with
a total building replacement value (excluding contents) of 38,404 million dollars (2006 dollars).
Approximately 91.74% of the buildings (and 70.45% of the building value) are associated with
residential housing.
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Figure 14 - Study Region for Flood Model
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8.3 Region Data
Table 9 Regional Population and Building Value Data
Regional Population and Building Value Data
Building Value (thousands of dollars)
Population
Residential
Non-Residential Total
Georgia
Walker
Dade
Catoosa
Total
Tennessee
Bradley
Hamilton
Marion
Total
Total Study
Region

61.053
15,154
53,282
129,489

2,415,850
580,225
2,249,795
5,245,870

793,796
282,167
688,974
1,764,937

3,209,646
862,392
2,938,769
7,010,807

87,965
307,896
27,776
423,637
553,126

4,040,217
16,696,018
1,072,362
21,808,597
27,054,467

1,512,411
7,682,541
389,914
9,584,866
11,349,803

5,552,628
24,378,559
1,462,276
31,393,463
38,404,270

Table 10 presents the relative distribution of the value with respect to the general occupancies by
study region.
Table 10 Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Study Region
Occupancy
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Agricultural
Religion
Government
Education
Total

Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Study Region
Exposure ($1000)
Percent of Total
27,054,467
70.4%
7,131,701
18.6%
2.509,487
6.5%
90,175
0.2%
1,051,191
2.7%
246,339
0.6%
320,910
0.8%
38,404,270
100.00%
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A well protected transportation system in the event of a natural disaster will allow for
proper evacuation and efficient emergency response. Table 11 shows the total transportation
exposure for the study region. The three major types of transportation in this area are highway
segments, highway bridges and railway segments.

HAZUS-MH does not account for the

damage to highway segments but there are other ways to find estimates relating to the damage.

Table 11 Transportation Exposure for the Study Region
Transportation Type
Highway Tunnel
Highway Segment
Highway Bridge
Railway Segment
Railway Bridge
Railway Facility
Bus Facility
Port Facility
Airport Facility
Total

Transportation Exposure for the Study Region
Exposure ($1000)
Percent of Total
$12,864
0.14%
$7,649,361
83.55%
$802,290
8.76%
$541,034
5.91%
$3,424
0.04%
$39,945
0.44%
$5,755
0.06%
$57,913
0.63%
$42,604
0.47%
$9,155,190
100.00%

To capture the geographic nature of the region, a DEM was imported from the USGS into
the program. This allows ArcMAP to represent the terrain surface of the region and calculate the
depth of the river bed to perform hydrologic analysis. The DEM imported into the program is
slightly larger than the study area to account for the geographic effect on the hydrology. Figure
15 shows a diagram of the imported DEM.
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Figure 15 - Regional DEM for Study Area

Once the DEM is imported into the program the analysis can begin. The first thing that
needs to be done is to determine the type of flood that will be analyzed. The options are coastal
and riverine analysis. Since Tennessee is not a coastal area the obvious choice is a riverine
analysis. The second step in the analysis is to develop the stream network of the study area.
This is completed by selecting the minimum drainage area that each reach has within the
floodplain. Obviously the smaller the drainage area, the larger the amount of reaches found
within the program. The drainage area chosen for the analysis was 4.0 square miles. Smaller
reaches would not contribute a great deal to a larger return year flood analysis. The next step is
hydrologic and hydraulic analysis. This is used to determine the number of reaches and the
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depth of the reaches within the floodplain. The resulting map of the study region river reaches is
shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16 - Study Area Reaches

The next step in the analysis is to delineate the floodplain. This process determines the
areas subject to floodwater inundation for expected recurrence intervals. It also determines the
depth of water at each position within the floodplain. The importance of this step cannot be
understated because the depth of water is used to determine the damages to properties and their
contents. As previously stated, three recurrence levels are explored in this thesis, 100-year, 500year and 1000-year. Each recurrence level is run separately to explore the results and come up
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with the appropriate mitigation strategies pertaining to the storm interval. The probability of
occurrence is used in the benefit cost analysis to justify projects for floodplain improvement.
According to the 100 year return period there is a certain amount of building exposure subject to
flood damages.

This is estimated by the depth of water determined from the delineated

floodplain. Table 12 shows an estimate of the results of exposure based on the occupancy type
of each structure.

8.4 100 Year Return Period

Table 12 Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (100 Year Return Period)
Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (100 Year Return Period)
Occupancy
Exposure ($1000)
Percent of Total
Residential
$3,208,423
66.5%
Commercial
$968,840
20.1%
Industrial
$453,205
9.4%
Agricultural
$10,016
0.2%
Religion
$121,094
2.5%
Government
$43,072
0.9%
Education
$18,163
0.4%
Total
$4,822,813
100.0%

HAZUS estimates that about 1,330 buildings will be at least moderately damaged. This
is over 70% of the total number of buildings in the scenario. There are an estimated 307
buildings that will be completely destroyed. The definition of the “damage states” is provided in
Volume 1: Chapter 5.3 of the HAZUS Flood Technical Manual. Table 13 below summarizes the
expected damage by general occupancy for the buildings in the region. Table 14 summarizes the
expected damage by general building type.
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Table 13 Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (100 Year Return Period)
Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (100 Year Return Period)
1 – 10

11-20

21-30

31-40

41-50

Substantially

Occupancy

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Commercial

0

0.00

8

42.11

7

36.84

2

10.53

1

5.26

1

5.26

Education

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Government

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Industrial

0

0.00

6

46.15

2

15.38

3

23.08

1

7.69

1

7.69

Religion

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Residential

0

0.00

28

2.16

321

24.73

155

11.94

489

37.67

305

23.50

Total

0

42

330

160

491

307

Table 14 Expected Building Damage by Building Type (100 Year Return Period))
Expected Building Damage by Building Type (100 Year Return Period)
Building Type
Concrete
ManufHousing
Masonry
Steel
Wood

1-10
Count
0
0
0
0
0

%
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

11-20
Count
1
0
1
5
29

%
20.00
0.00
1.54
41.67
2.49

21-30
Count
2
0
11
3
315

%
40.00
0.00
16.92
25.00
27.09

31-40
Count
1
0
7
2
151

%
20.00
0.00
10.77
16.67
12.98

41-50
Count
1
0
33
1
461

%
20.00
0.00
50.77
8.33
39.64

Substantially
Count %
0
0.00
86
100.00
13
20.00
1
8.33
207
17.80

For essential facilities, there are 10 hospitals in the region with a total capacity of 2,006
beds. There are 208 schools, 42 fire stations, 37 police stations and 1 emergency operation
center. Before the flood analyzed in this scenario, the region had 2,006 hospital beds available
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for use. On the day of the scenario flood event, the model estimates that 2,006 hospital beds are
available in the region. Table 15 shows the expected damage to essential facilities in the region.

Table 15 Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (100 Year Return Period)
Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (100 Year Return Period)
# Facilities
Classification
Total
At Least
At Least
Loss of Use
Moderate
Substantial
Fire Stations
42
1
0
1
Hospitals
10
0
0
0
Police Stations
37
1
0
1
Schools
208
3
0
3

8.5 Debris Generation
HAZUS estimates the amount of debris that will be generated by the flood. This model
breaks debris into three general categories: 1) Finishes (dry wall, insulation, etc.), 2) Structural
(wood, brick, etc.) and 3) Foundations (concrete slab, concrete block, rebar, etc.).

This

distinction is made because of the different types of material handling equipment required to
handle the debris.
The model estimates that a total of 154,153 tons of debris will be generated for the 100
year return period.

Of the total amount, Finishes comprises 24% of the total, Structures

comprises 41% of the total. If the debris tonnage is converted into an estimated number of
truckloads, it will require 6,166 truckloads (at 25 tons/truck) to remove the debris generated by
the flood.
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8.6 Shelter Requirements
HAZUS estimates the number of households that are expected to be displaced from their
homes due to the flood and the associated potential evacuation. HAZUS also estimates those
displaced people that will require accommodations in temporary public shelters. The model
estimates 3,120 households will be displaced due to the 100 year flood. Displacement includes
households evacuated from within or very near to the inundated area. Of these, 7,180 people
(out of a total population of 553,126) will seek temporary shelter in public shelters.

8.7 Economic Loss
The total economic loss estimated for the flood is 611.77 million dollars for the 100 year
return period, which represents 12.68% of the total value of the scenario buildings.

8.8 Building Related Losses
The building losses are broken into two categories: direct building losses and business
interruption losses. The direct building losses are the estimated costs to repair or replace the
damage caused to the building and its contents. The business interruption losses are the losses
associated with inability to operate a business because of the damage sustained during the flood.
Business interruption losses also include the temporary living expenses for those people
displaced from their homes because of the flood.
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The total building related losses were 608.60 million dollars. 1% of the estimated losses
were related to the business interruption of the region. The residential occupancies made up
34.44% of the total loss.

Table 16 Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (100 Year Return Period)

Category
Building
Loss

Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (100 Year Return Period)
(Millions of dollars)
Area
Residential Commercial Industrial
Others
Total

Building
Content
Inventory
Subtotal

130.99
79.39
0.00
210.38

66.11
154.02
6.72
226.85

34.33
81.64
19.92
135.89

6.82
28.33
0.32
35.46

238.26
343.38
26.96
608.60

Income
Relocation
Rental
Income
Wage
Subtotal
Total

0.01
0.19
0.05

0.84
0.19
0.13

0.01
0.01
0.00

0.04
0.02
0.00

0.90
0.41
0.19

0.04
0.30
210.68

1.00
2.16
229.01

0.01
0.03
135.92

0.63
0.69
36.16

1.68
3.18
611.77

Business
Interruption

ALL

The analysis was run again for the same study region for a 500-year return period. The
building exposure by occupancy type is shown in Table 17. Obviously, since the delineated
floodplain is larger for a 500 year event, the building exposure dollar amount is higher than the
100 year scenario.
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8.9 500 Year Return Period
Table 17 Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (500 Year Return Period)
Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (500 Year Return Period)
Occupancy
Exposure ($1000)
Percent of Total
Residential
$4,157,789
64.4%
Commercial
$1,312,775
20.3%
Industrial
$714,979
11.1%
Agricultural
$14,820
0.2%
Religion
$159,679
2.5%
Government
$54,864
0.8%
Education
$41,865
0.6%
Total
$6,456,771
100.0%

HAZUS estimates that about 2,029 buildings will be at least moderately damaged. This
is over 70% of the total number of buildings in the scenario. There are an estimated 564
buildings that will be completely destroyed. Table 18 summarizes the expected damage by
general occupancy for the buildings in the region. Table 19 summarizes the expected damage by
general building type.
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Table 18 Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (500 Year Return Period)
Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (500 Year Return Period)
1 – 10

11-20

21-30

31-40

41-50

Substantially

Occupancy

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Commercial

3

9.38

11

34.3

7

21.88

5

15.63

2

6.25

4

12.50

Education

1

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Government

4

100.0
0
80.00

1

20.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Industrial

0

0.00

11

55.00

3

15.00

3

15.00

2

10.00

1

5.00

Religion

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Residential

0

0.00

39

1.97

441

22.28

234

11.82

706

35.67

559

28.25

Total

8

62

451

242

710

564

Table 19 Expected Building Damage by Building Type (500 Year Return Period)
Expected Building Damage by Building Type (500 Year Return Period)
Building Type
Concrete
ManufHousing
Masonry
Steel
Wood

1-10
Count
1
0
1
1
0

%
11.11
0.00
0.96
5.26
0.00

11-20
Count
3
0
2
9
39

%
33.33
0.00
1.92
47.37
2.24

21-30
Count
2
0
17
2
428

%
22.22
0.00
16.35
10.53
24.63

31-40
Count
1
0
9
4
228

%
11.11
0.00
8.65
21.05
13.12

41-50
Count
1
0
49
2
667

%
11.11
0.00
47.12
10.53
38.38

Substantially
Count %
1
11.11
165
100.00
26
25.00
1
5.26
376
21.63

Before the flood analyzed in this scenario, the region had 2,006 hospital beds available
for use. On the day of the scenario flood event, the model estimates that 1,834 hospital beds are
available in the region. The difference in availability can be accounted for by the number of
individuals in need after the event has occurred.
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Table 20 Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (500 Year Return Period)
Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (500 Year Return Period)
# Facilities
Classification
Total
At Least
At Least
Loss of Use
Moderate
Substantial
Fire Stations
42
2
0
2
Hospitals
10
0
1
1
Police Stations
37
1
0
1
Schools
208
8
1
6

8.10 Debris Generation
The model estimates that a total of 232,887 tons of debris will be generated for the 500
year return period.

Of the total amount, Finishes comprises 25% of the total, Structures

comprises 40% of the total. If the debris tonnage is converted into an estimated number of
truckloads, it will require 9,315 truckloads (at 25 tons/truck) to remove the debris generated by
the flood.

8.11 Shelter Requirements
The model estimates 4,703 households will be displaced due to the 500 year flood.
Displacement includes households evacuated from within or very near to the inundated area. Of
these, 10,484 people (out of a total population of 553,126) will seek temporary shelter in public
shelters
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8.12 Economic Loss
The total economic loss estimated for the flood is 959.39 million dollars, which
represents 14.86% of the total replacement value of the scenario buildings.

8.13 Building Related Loss
The total building related losses were 954.07 million dollars. 1% of the estimated losses
were related to the business interruption of the region. The residential occupancies made up
35.22% of the total loss. Table 21 provides a summary of the losses associated with the building
damage.

Table 21 Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (500 Year Return Period)

Category
Building
Loss

Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (500 Year Return Period)
(Millions of dollars)
Area
Residential Commercial Industrial
Others
Total

Building
Content
Inventory
Subtotal

210.55
126.88
0.00
337.43

102.02
237.32
10.33
349.67

52.89
122.02
30.06
204.98

12.20
49.35
0.43
61.99

377.66
535.58
40.82
954.07

Income
Relocation
Rental
Income
Wage
Subtotal
Total

0.02
0.28
0.07

1.35
0.34
0.21

0.01
0.02
0.00

0.13
0.05
0.01

1.51
0.69
0.30

0.05
0.43
337.86

1.63
3.53
353.20

0.02
0.06
205.03

1.11
1.30
63.29

2.82
5.32
959.39

Business
Interruption

ALL

87

The final flood scenario ran for this report is the 1000-year event. Table 22 provides a summary
of the building exposure by occupancy type for the scenario.

8.14 1000 Year Return Period

Table 22 Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (1000 Year Return Period)
Building Exposure by Occupancy Type for the Scenario (1000 Year Return Period)
Occupancy
Exposure ($1000)
Percent of Total
Residential
$5,508,248
67.7%
Commercial
$1,544,678
19.0%
Industrial
$742,982
9.1%
Agricultural
$20,468
0.3%
Religion
$200,549
2.5%
Government
$56,973
0.7%
Education
$58,323
0.7%
Total
$6,540,655
100.0%

HAZUS estimates that about 2,385 buildings will be at least moderately damaged. This
is over 71% of the total number of buildings in the scenario. There are at least 628 buildings that
will be completely destroyed. Table 23 summarizes the expected damage by general occupancy
for the buildings in the region. Table 24 summarizes the expected damage by the general
building type.
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Table 23 Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (1000 Year Return Period)
Expected Building Damage by Occupancy (1000 Year Return Period)
1 – 10

11-20

21-30

31-40

41-50

Substantially

Occupancy

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Commercial

2

7.41

9

33.33

8

29.63

4

14.81

1

3.70

3

11.11

Education

1

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Government

4

100.0
0
80.00

1

20.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Industrial

0

0.00

9

47.37

3

15.79

5

26.32

1

5.26

1

5.26

Religion

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

Residential

0

0.00

42

1.79

524

22.39

260

11.11

890

38.03

624

26.67

Total

7

61

535

269

892

628

Table 24 Expected Building Damage by Building Type (1000 Year Return Period)
Expected Building Damage by Building Type (1000 Year Return Period)
Building Type
Concrete
ManufHousing
Masonry
Steel
Wood

1-10
Count
1
0
1
1
0

%
14.29
0.00
0.88
5.56
0.00

11-20
Count
2
0
2
8
42

%
28.57
0.00
1.77
44.44
2.04

21-30
Count
2
0
21
3
511

%
28.57
0.00
18.58
16.67
24.85

31-40
Count
1
0
9
4
256

%
14.29
0.00
7.96
22.22
12.45

41-50
Count
1
0
55
1
848

%
14.29
0.00
48.67
5.56
41.25

Substantially
Count %
0
0.00
204
100.00
25
22.12
1
5.56
399
19.41

Before the flood analyzed in this scenario, the region had 2,006 hospital beds available
for use. On the day of the scenario flood event, the model estimates that 1,834 hospital beds are
available in the region.
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Table 25 Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (1000 Year Return Period)
Expected Damage to Essential Facilities (1000 Year Return Period)
# Facilities
Classification
Total
At Least
At Least
Loss of Use
Moderate
Substantial
Fire Stations
42
2
0
2
Hospitals
10
1
1
1
Police Stations
37
2
0
2
Schools
208
7
1
5

8.15 Debris Generation
The model estimates that a total of 277,250 tons of debris will be generated for the 1000
year return period.

Of the total amount, Finishes comprises 26% of the total, Structures

comprises 39% of the total. If the debris tonnage is converted into an estimated number of
truckloads, it will require 11,090 truckloads (at 25 tons/truck) to remove the debris generated by
the flood.

8.16 Shelter Requirements
The model estimates 6,613 households will be displaced due to the 1000 year flood.
Displacement includes households evacuated from within or very near to the inundated area. Of
these, 14,016 people (out of a total population of 553,126) will seek temporary shelter in public
shelters.
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8.17 Economic Loss
The total economic loss estimated for the flood is 1,079.47 million dollars, which
represents 13.27% of the total replacement value of the scenario buildings.

8.18 Building Related Loss
The total building related losses were 1,074.12 million dollars. Roughly 0% of the
estimated losses were related to the business interruption of the region as shown in Table 25.
The residential occupancies made up 40.18% of the total loss. Table 26 provides a summary of
the losses associated with the building damage.

Table 26 Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (1000 Year Return Period)

Category
Building
Loss

Building Related Economic Loss Estimates (1000 Year Return Period)
(Millions of dollars)
Area
Residential Commercial Industrial
Others
Total

Building
Content
Inventory
Subtotal

270.72
162.56
0.00
433.28

105.61
244.62
10.31
360.54

52.07
120.13
29.40
201.59

15.05
63.14
0.52
78.71

443.44
590.45
40.23
1,074.12

Income
Relocation
Rental
Income
Wage
Subtotal
Total

0.02
0.33
0.07

1.32
0.31
0.20

0.01
0.02
0.00

0.16
0.07
0.01

1.50
0.73
0.28

0.06
0.48
433.75

1.53
3.36
363.90

0.02
0.05
201.64

1.23
1.47
80.18

2.84
5.35
1,079.47

Business
Interruption

ALL
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This chapter presented the findings of the analysis of a regional flood event surrounding
Hamilton County, TN. The total economic losses incurred by the region for the 100, 500 and
1000 year flood events are 611.77, 959.39 and 1,079.47 million dollars respectively. In the event
that any of these simulations were to take place a federal disaster would be declared. There are
several issues that need to be addressed to reduce the damages for each flood event. Chapter 9
discusses the case study in detail and how it relates to historical damages in Hamilton County as
well as the State of Tennessee.
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CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION

Emergency preparedness plans are usually broken into several categories according to
their phase within the system.

The ability of a community’s infrastructure to continue to

function in the face of unexpected hazard events will determine the duration of recovery as well
as its resilience as a whole. The following chapter regarding the discussion of the findings
within the case study is broken into four categories: response, recovery, mitigation and
preparation.

Within each section the framework discussed in previous chapters will be

implemented and discussed.

9.1 Determine the Question
The question or issue being raised in this thesis is how can determining the physical and
economic effects of urban floods on critical infrastructure and surrounding communities help
improve resiliency and preparedness to natural disasters. How can past occurrences as well as
scientific based simulations of this type of phenomena bring attention to the growing issue facing
the world? With climate change causing sea levels to be higher, temperatures to rise as well as
warming ocean waters the scientific community is declaring the age of the super storm is
imminent. Once the problem is understood in the broadest of terms the next question is what
data is needed to address or support the claim. In other words the problem has to be analyzed
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with figures and numbers to support the claim. This is completed in chapter 7 with the case
study for the Hamilton County area.

9.2 Problem Analysis
The concern surrounding emergency preparedness revolves around three important
questions that were presented in the opening chapter: how much will it cost to fix the problem,
how long will it take to fix the problem and how many people will be affected. Financial
consideration is the main issue facing pre disaster mitigation because it is an issue that is easy to
forget about until the unfortunate occurs. Before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast there were
numerous attempts by local experts as well as the Army Corps of Engineers to fix the issue of
faulty flood defense systems but there was no room in the budget to do so. In the aftermath of
the storm the government has committed $14.5 billion to flood protection improvements. The
estimated total damages induced by the storm total $96 billion. There is no way to determine the
amount of damage that could have been avoided as well as the avoided loss of life had there been
earlier intervention. Although there are systems in place to help with pre-disaster mitigation
there has to be more foresight given to these situations. The amount of time that it takes to fix
the problem is directly proportional to the scale of the disaster as well as the level of recovery
deemed necessary for future problems. As with the amount of time it takes to recover the
community and numbers of individuals affected by the storm event are relative to the scale of
disaster. It is up to government officials, the public and private sector, and experts in the
required fields to alleviate this issue and come up with measurable goals and solutions.
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9.3 Choose an Appropriate Turnaround Strategy
In business a turnaround strategy is applied to a company to determine the root cause of
failure. Different analysis techniques are put to use and when the failure mechanism has been
determined the evaluator proposes long term restructuring plans to forecast for future problems
and ensure success. Flood management is a broad subject requiring experts from diverse fields
to come together and solve its problems. The
There
re are vested interests in both the private and public
sector in regulating this issue. When an area is flooded both sectors are affected with loss of
business and damages. This is why they must work together to create public
public-private
private partnerships
to mitigate this issue.

Public Sector

Private Sector

•Federal Level
•State Level
•Local Level

•Insurance
•Investors
•Stakeholders

Figure 17 - Public Private Partnerships
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Flood
Management

The public sector must create the legislation at all levels of government to provide stricter
regulations of flood control. At a local level emergency officials in vulnerable areas need to
make an effort to inform residents of their level of exposure. People that have been properly
informed have plans in place for adverse situations. Local governments have to make efforts to
stop construction in dangerous areas within the flood plain through land use control. Historically
floodplains have been an attractive site for new construction due to their proximity to natural
bodies of water and aesthetically pleasing views, but poses high risk in the event of flooding.
New construction should adhere to the guidelines presented in the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) in accordance with FEMA. A community that wants to be eligible for federal
funds following a natural disaster has to adopt a floodplain management ordinance. The 100
year floodplains need to be reevaluated and updated based on changes to the floodplain as well
as changes to the weather patterns.

State and federal level contributions should include

legislation, federal standards and improvements to infrastructure. Currently the United States
only spends 2 percent of the GDP on infrastructure as opposed to the 5 and 9 percent spent by
Europe and China, respectively. Although the amount of spending on infrastructure and its
improvements is not a solitary indicator of the level of attention paid to development and
protection efforts of a country the fact that spending has dropped by 50% since the 1960’s does
raise a disturbing issue [37].

Federal involvement usually only occurs after it has been

established that the state is overwhelmed and in need of assistance by presidential declaration.
Seeing that the federal government has spent $136 billion total from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal
year 2013 on disaster relief efforts it would be more economically sensible to focus on predisaster mitigation [38]. According to FEMA every dollar spent on hazard mitigation provides
the nation with about $4 in future benefits [38]. Pre-disaster mitigation will help save both
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money and avoid loss of life in the event of future hazards. This initiative is a large task to
undertake but with help from the private sector it is feasible.
There is much the public sector can learn from the private in terms of financing large
scale projects. Historically when the government gets involved with construction projects or
even just large scale proposals there are overruns on both costs and completion dates. Political
agendas and bureaucracy get in the way of the initial plan and generally ruins the outcome.
Since the government is necessary for a plan involving the nation’s well-being it is important to
establish public-private partnerships. As previously stated the private sector has just as much at
stake when it comes to losses associated with natural disasters. A study conducted by the
Government Accountability Office found that approximately 85% of the nation’s critical
infrastructure and key resources are owned by the private sector [39]. So when disaster strikes
not only do they have to worry about damages but also lost revenue due to system inoperability.
The determination of the role each sector will play in emergency response can be resolved by
forming a local response and resilience committee. The public sector element will be comprised
of first responders such as the police, fire department, emergency planners, etc. They will work
with the private sector stakeholders such as utility providers, voluntary agencies and other vested
parties. Together both sectors can assess the risks facing their communities and determine the
best course of action for mitigation. The comprehensive plan can then be given to larger entities
such as the state government so they can review the needs on a larger scale and determine the
amount of financial need in terms of immediate risk. When the smaller issues of immediate need
are taken care of before disaster strikes it will improve overall resilience and alleviate future
complications. This principle is similar to the “Fix it First” initiative suggested by congress.
Instead of focusing on constructing new facilities the older facilities should be evaluated to
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determine the amount of repair necessary. If it is determined that repair is economically feasible
renovation should take place otherwise proceed with new construction. In order to stay with the
theme of resilient communities planning for new construction should include input from
emergency planners so they can offer advice concerning building codes, land use, risks, and
etcetera. This way all concerned parties are aware and their recommendations have been heard.
An additional way the private sector can help with disaster assistance is through private
insurance. Currently the NFIP covers the majority of the nation’s flood risk but it is now $18
billion in debt [40]. Due to the large debt owed by the NFIP and the overwhelming claims
placed on the organization the insurance premiums are growing. The Biggert-Waters Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 calls on the various government agencies involved to change the
way the NFIP is run. This act wants to raise rates based on the level of flood risk as well as
change how floodplain mapping impacts policy holders. The major issue with this policy change
is historically the population that is most vulnerable to floods happens to be poor. If these
individuals can no longer afford flood insurance because of the rising premiums the costs to
recover will fall squarely on the tax payers. The money that is paid out for disaster recovery
from the government already comes from taxpayers so this will just add to the burden. If
incentive is put in place for private insurance companies to also carry flood insurance
competitive rates will help drive costs down.

9.4 Implement the Change Process
Formation of committees to assess risks for communities as well as determine
comprehensive plans of action is the first step in emergency management. Implementation of the
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approved process determined is the next logical step. The following sections describe ways to
respond, recover and mitigate the risks of urban flooding.

9.5 Vulnerability
The return periods explored in this thesis are based on annual probabilities of each of
their occurrences. As explained previously, the 100 year return period does not necessarily mean
that this event will occur once every 100 years. Historical accounts of each event are taken into
context when predicting the probability of occurrence.

When evaluating natural hazards

according to the Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) it is imperative
to take three things into consideration: probability of occurrence, historical occurrence and likely
extent/magnitude. Each of these categories are explained followed by Table 27 illustrating
Hamilton County’s vulnerability [41].
Probability of Occurrence
•

High: Greater than 20 percent probability each year, or at least one chance in the next 5
years

•

Moderate: Between a 5 and 10 percent probability in the next year, or at least one chance
in the next 10 years

•

Low: Between a 1 and 5 percent probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the
next 20 to 100 years

Historic Occurrence
• High: At least once every five years
• Moderate: At least once every 10 years
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• Low: At least once in the last 20 to 100 years
• Unknown: Historic data was not available for evaluation
Likely Extent/Magnitude (one or more criteria may be met)
•

Serious: Severe injuries, loss of life, significant property damage, evacuations and
provision of emergency shelter.

•

Moderate: Some injuries, property damage; disruption of area for more than 24 hours.

•

Minimal: Minor injuries, disruption of the area for less than 24 hours, minor property
damage.

Table 27 Hamilton County Flood Hazard Probability [41]
Hamilton County Flood Hazard Probability
Hazard

Flood

Jurisdiction

Probability of
Occurrence

Historic
Occurrence

Likely Extent/Magnitude

Unincorporated
County

High (Valley)
Moderate (Plateau)

Moderate

Collegedale

High

High (Valley)
Moderate
(Plateau)
Moderate

Moderate

Chattanooga

High

High

Serious

East Ridge

High

High

Serious

Lakesite

Low

Low

Minimal

Lookout Mountain

Low

Low

Minimal

Red Bank

High

High

Moderate

Soddy-Daisy

High

High

Moderate

Signal Mountain

Low

Low

Minimal

Walden

Low

Low

Minimal

UTC
HCDE

High
Moderate

High
Moderate

Low
Moderate

The flood events on record for Hamilton County fall mostly within the 100 and 500 year
return periods. There is no official record of a 1000 year flood event for Hamilton County. This
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is not to say that one has never or never will happen in this area. In May 2010 a 1000 year flood
event occurred in Nashville, TN. Due to the recent increase rate and devastation of natural
hazards it was deemed important to also explore possible damages related to that recurrence
interval. The flood types that are frequently associated with Hamilton County fall into the
categories of flash flooding and riverine flooding. The HAZUS-MH model utilized in the case
study for this thesis used the riverine analysis tool. Flooding mainly occurs in valley areas
flowing from higher elevations. Riverine floods often remain for weeks due to the nature of their
occurrence while flash floods drain quickly. Flash floods tend to affect newly developed areas as
the natural landscape has been altered and the natural drainage of these areas has been disturbed.

9.6 Damage Calculation
Flood damage functions are in the form of depth-damage curves which relate the depth of
flooding, in feet, as measured from the top of the first finished floor, to damage expressed as a
percent of replacement cost. Two of the main provisions used by HAZUS-MH to determine
building related damages are the age and foundation type of the building. Damages to older
buildings can be attributed to deterioration, out of date building codes and designs not up to
NFIP specifications. HAZUS “damage states” are developed from damage percentages. The
depth damage curves used were developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and
the USACE Institute for Water Resources (USACEIWR).
The model estimated building related residential economic losses of $210.38 million for
the 100 year return period and $337.43 million for the 500 year return period. The Hamilton
County Emergency Management Agency conducted studies for 100 and 500 year return periods
and their residential building losses for both were $192.78 million and $422.00 million
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respectively. That is a difference of approximately $17.6 million for the 100 year period and $84.57 million for the 500 year return period. The difference in losses can be attributed to the
case study including five additional counties other that Hamilton County. Although the study is
based primarily in Hamilton County there were additional reaches in the other counties to help
preserve geological formations.

Since 1994, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) has recorded 582 riverine flood impacts in the State of Tennessee.
Tennessee has 35 deaths and 1 injury relating to riverine flooding. These events have cost
Tennesseans $4,245,763,300 in property damage [42]. For Hamilton County specifically, the
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) has documented 35 flood events from 1993 to 2010 that
produce an annual average of $6.8 million in property damages [41]. The economic losses
associated with flooding focus mainly on residential and commercial property damages. The
records of losses associated with business interruption are usually on an individual basis so the
numbers are difficult to summarize.

9.7 Repetitive Loss
Repetitive Loss (RL) and Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) properties are a serious hazard related to
flooding. RL structures are categorized by residential properties that have received 2 or more
flood loss claims over $1000 each and SRL structures are properties that have received 4 or more
claims over $5000 each. Structures that have flooded repeatedly in the past and have a high
probability of future flooding are a major liability on the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP). Hamilton County has 149 repetitive loss structures with losses totaling to $7,134,138
with an average claim payout of $19,373 [42]. Table 28 below shows the repetitive loss
properties in Hamilton County by zip code.
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Table 28 Repetitive Loss Structures by Zip Code [41]
Repetitive Loss Structures by Zip Code
Total Loss (Building and
Zip Code
Contents)
37343
$445,362
37379
$88,378
37401
$39,253
37402
$69,165
37403
$10,188
37404
$96,719
37405
$175,369
37406
$64,808
37407
$440,591
37408
$863,442
37409
$102,917
37410
$162,001
37411
$326,421
37412
$3,025,828
37415
$453,835
37416
$73,313
37419
$403,544
37421
$255,886
67412
$37,118
Grand Total
$7,134,138

9.8 Loss of Essential Facilities
Loss of services from essential facilities can happen throughout an extreme weather
event. According to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency’s (TEMA) Continuity of
Operations Plan (COOP), it is assumed that all essential services will be available between 24 to
48 hours after a hazardous event has occurred. However extreme weather events can cause
extended periods without these services. Flooding can make roadways impassible, blackouts
cause wastewater facilities to shut down and prolong emergency operations. Development of
resilient infrastructure is crucial to decrease the impacts of natural hazards and increase the
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likelihood of continuity of services. Damages to essential facilities determined by HAZUS-MH
are calculated on an individual site basis.

9.9 Shelter Requirements
Each scenario ran gave a significant estimate of the population in need of short term
shelter. In addition to having adequate space for the displaced population there must also be a
sufficient number of supplies as well as trained personnel.

Table 29 Shelter Requirements by Scenario
100 Year Scenario
3,120 households
7,180 people

Shelter Requirements by Scenario
500 Year Scenario
1000 Year Scenario
4,703 households
6,613 households
10,484 people
14,016 people

Public buildings such as schools, religious institutions, and so on can be used to provide
emergency accommodation after a disaster. These shelters are designated to provide a safe
living place for individuals immediately following a disaster event. They are meant to reduce the
vulnerability to health problems and future immediate danger. The assumption is that these
dwellings are meant for the immediate period only, and any longer assistance after falls outside
of the realm of the emergency contribution. Any other shelter is viewed as emergency housing
which is a long term resolution after the event such as the FEMA trailers that were distributed
across the South East region following the Hurricane Katrina event.
Like all of the other aspects of the response phase the type of shelter provided is
dependent upon the scale of the disaster. The amount of damage caused is directly proportional
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to the amount of the displaced population. The costs of assistance are usually handled at the
local level by companies, local government, non-profit organizations and the people of the
community as no one entity has the resources to provide all necessary assistance. Studies have
shown that people in developing countries as well as rural communities tend to be more self
reliant and resourceful in disaster situations. This can be attributed to the fact that they tend to
grow their own food and construct their homes. If the hazard is small enough that they can stay
at their own place they are more likely to be self sufficient. However these individuals will be
hit the hardest if a major disaster strikes due to their proximity to large scale disaster relief areas.
Survivors tend to want to stay as close to their homes and places of business as possible unless
compulsory evacuation takes place. Mass emergency shelters at community based buildings are
temporary in nature and should only be viewed as an intermediate phase between evacuation and
reconstruction. The resources provided at these shelters are in short supply and accommodations
are usually on a first come first serve basis. The timeline for these shelters and the supplies only
last up to a few weeks post-disaster and then evacuees must seek other means of refuge during
the recovery period.
The case study performed for this thesis returned figures that are very alarming. Recent
studies have proven that the costs associated with natural disasters continue to rise and the
devastation causes the effects to prolong the recovery process. The HCEMA’s current mitigation
strategies rely heavily on the assumption that Federal funds will be available to fix existing
issues. It is not enough to rely on national programs to help with local issues. Solutions to local
issues need to start at the local level and use federal help as necessary due to the fact that there is
no “one size fits all” for natural disaster mitigation. Local officials from all areas of interest
must work together to establish guidelines for continuous improvement of disaster mitigation.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Objectives of the Study
The objective of this study was to establish a framework to improve the impacts of
physical and economical damages to critical infrastructure and surrounding communities.
Validation of the framework was carried out by performing a case study to determine the
damages inflicted on a community from a flood event. The framework included a six step
pragmatic approach to research.

10.2 Summary of the Findings

The validation of the framework consisted of performing a case study of a series of flood
events and how the physical and economic damages would impact a region.

The city of

Chattanooga is the most flood prone in the state of Tennessee so Hamilton County was at the
center of investigation. To get a regional impact area additional counties in Tennessee Marion
and Bradley were investigated also Dade, Walker & Catoosa counties in the state of Georgia.
The economic damages were expressed as losses which totaled 611.77, 959.39 and 1,079.47
million dollars for the 100, 500 & 1000 year flood events respectively. The physical damages
were represented by destruction to buildings, essentials facilities, transportation networks, etc.
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Due to the amount of economic damages caused by all three scenarios, government intervention
in the form of emergency aid would be necessary for repair. The urgency for intervention in
addition to economic justification determines the type of flood control method put into operation.
For more vulnerable areas subjected to large amounts of damage hard engineering tactics such as
levees are necessary for protection. Soft engineering practices are used when there is enough
time to let natural methods take place. In addition to physical flood control methods other means
of warning include improving the warning time given to citizens of the community, proper
preparation of shelters, increasing knowledge of vulnerability, and formation of committees at
the local level to evaluate needs.

10.3 Conclusions

The need for a major overhaul of the protection of communities and critical infrastructure
in relation to natural disasters is upon us. The rising costs and devastation is putting this and
other countries around the globe in financial hardship. Pre-disaster mitigation has a greater
effect on preparedness and reducing the destruction from these events. Financial considerations
by far have the greatest effect on disaster relief and mitigation endeavors. Restructuring federal
and state disaster aid based on vulnerability and risk analysis will decrease harmful impacts.
There is a need for a formation of a committee of experts from relevant fields of interest to share
their knowledge and structure a well-rounded approach to disaster management.

These

committees should be at both the federal and local level. Stricter federal standards should be put
in place for structural flood protection. Overall awareness must be increased at all levels. When
people are informed and prepared for disaster the loss of property and lives will be reduced.
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10.4 Recommendations for Further Study
There are new technologies currently in the research stage for flood control that warrant a
closer look.

New sustainable infrastructure is being equipped with embedded sensors for

environmental monitoring. These sensors include GIS data modeling to measure water levels
and air pressure. In the event of water levels reaching dangerous heights these sensors send
information to emergency operation centers to alert the public. GIS technology in general has
proven to be an effective tool in flood risk management. Topics for further exploration include
using GIS mapping to identify impacted locations and GIS based risk assessment for flood
modeling.
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APPENDIX A
STEP BY STEP INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHORTEST PATH

114

Step 1: Enter columns into Excel for the following categories: Begin, Destination, On Route,
Distance, Nodes, Net flow and Supply/Demand.
Step 2: In the Begin column put all of the beginning nodes with the number of destinations that
they have. For example, node S has three destination nodes in A, B & C so it has three
beginning nodes. In the Destination column put all of the destination nodes according to the
beginning node column. The spreadsheet should now look like this:

Figure 18 - Step 2 in Shortest Route Calculation
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Step 3: Make an On Route column but leave this column blank. This will be the variable column
used in the analysis. Next to this column make the Distance column and put all of the
corresponding distances for each begin to destination node. The spreadsheet should now
resemble Figure 19 below:

Figure 19 - Step 3 in Shortest Route Calculation

Step 4: Make the columns for Nodes, Net flow and Supply/Demand. For each column created,
highlight the information in each column and rename it after its title. In the On Route column
add an extra cell at the bottom for the total distance of the travel. The final layout of the
spreadsheet should look like this, in Figure 20.
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Figure 20 - Step 4 in Shortest Route Calculation

Step 5: In the Net Flow column enter the following equation into the Source node space:

Figure 21 - Step 5 in Shortest Route Calculation
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This is the net flow for each node. This only sums the column if each requirement is met by the
analysis. Drag this equation below for each node.
Step 6: In the total distance cell in the On Route column enter the following equation:

Figure 22 - Step 6 in Shortest Route Calculation

This product is the multiplication of the route optimal route taken and the distance of each route.
The number in the cell is zero now because the analysis has not taken place.
Step 7: Open the solver in Excel. Set the target cell to the total distance cell. This is a
minimization program so set the equal to portion to Min. Set the values for the “By changing
cells” box to On Route. The constraints of this program are so that the net flow is equal to the
supply and demand. Click on the options portion of the solver and check the boxes next to
Assume Linear Model and Assume Non Negative. Figures 23 and 24 below show the results of
Step 7. Once this is completed click OK.
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Figure 23 - Step 7 in Shortest Route Calculation

Figure 24 - Step 7 in Shortest Route Calculation

119

Step 8: The Solver has found a solution in the On Route Column. This column is now full of
ones and zeros. The ones express the optimal route which is S-C-E-G-EC. This is the optimal
route for the drive with a total distance of 18 miles.

Figure 25 - Step 8 in Shortest Route Calculation
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